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Abstract 
Failed and failing states are a growing concern throughout the world These 
states leave the United Nations and the international community in the position of either 
helping or ignoring them. Unfortunately, when the UN has chosen to intervene, it has 
been unsuccessfol in solving the state's long term problems. This thesis will examine two 
case studies of 'failed' interventions, Somalia and Haiti, and existing theoretical models 
in order to I) explore the strategies available to the UN to stop complex emergencies in 
failed states and then to reconstruct them, and 2) propose a new humanitarian 
intervention framework embodying these lessons. 
ii 
Once more unto the breac~ dear friends, once more, 
Or close the wall up with our English dead. 
In peace there's nothing so becomes a man 
As modest stillness and humility, 
But when the blast of war blows in our ears, 
Then imitate the action of the tiger. 
Stiffen the sinews, conjure up the blood, 
Disguise fair nature with hard-favoured rage. 
William Shakespeare, Henry V Act 3 Scene 1 
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Chapter 1: The United Nations and Failed States 
I. A Prelimiaarv Orieatatioa 
Orchard 1 
Since the end of the Cold War, a new and growing phenomenon has emerged: 
states that, for all practical purposes, fail. These failed states create three substantial 
problems. They create violence as parties within the states begin to wage war. They create 
refugees and internally-displaced persons as people flee the fighting. Most importantly, 
they create humanitarian emergencies as the population can no longer receive the 
fundamental requirements for life. 
The international actor of last resort, the United Nations, has always seen itself as 
having four main purposes: to maintain international peace and security, to develop 
friendly relations among nations, to co-operate in solving international problems and in 
promoting respect for human rights, and to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of 
nations. 1 
The end of the Cold War gave the UN a new ability to intervene decisively in 
countries that appeared to be a threat to international peace and security, a category that 
grew to encompass these failed states. But the UN is "a characteristic institution of 
international society and the creature of its Member States ... "2 It prides itself on providing 
"the means to help resolve international conflict and fonnulate policies on matters 
affecting all of us. At the UN, all the Member States - large and small, rich and poor, with 
differing political views and social systems - have a voice and vote in this process. "3 
While all Member States agree to accept the principles of the UN Charter, this acceptance 
often takes a back seat to the principles of sovereignty. 
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This meant that through its first 45 years, the UN chose to intervene in member 
states only with their consent.4 The end of the Cold War and the emergence of failed 
states altered this considerably. The UN accepted that this norm could be overridden for 
two reasons: to protect the international order, where "the intervention is taken for valid 
reasons of international peace and security,"5 and for humanitarianism, where "the 
intervention is to protect the population of the target state ... from grave abuses at the 
bands of their own government or anti-government rebels or as a result of domestic 
anarchy. n6 
With this change of emphasis, it did not take long before the UN found itself 
intervening in two failed states ·Somalia and Haiti- in an effort to end the anarchy and 
then to rebuild each country. Unfortunately, while the tools at the liN's disposal increased 
dramatically, it was poorly equipped to deal with states that literally had no government 
left. This meant that substantial mistakes were made, both in the short and long term, 
resulting in the failure of both missions. 
Perhaps the solution is simply not to intervene in such states. Despite the rhetoric, 
failed states seldom pose a direct threat to international security. In the past, they have 
been allowed to simmer with hardly a problem- why choose to intervene in Somalia and 
not the Sudan? When a country is ripe for peace, its problems may be solved far more 
easily through negotiations than through an intervention. Edward Luttwak argues that 
peace becomes attractive to belligerents only after hopes of military success have faded. 
Therefore, the United Nations and other international actors, when they choose to 
intervene in a state through actions such as enforcing cease-fires, which allow belligerents 
to rest, reconstitute and rearm their forces, 7 and through NGOs, which aid the belligerents 
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because the belligerents steal from them, 1 "perversely... can systematically prevent the 
transformation of war into peace ... peace takes hold only when war is truly over."9 
However, the indirect effects of failed states and combat in general can be 
significant. Refugee flows and arms smuggling may destablize the entire region- the fear 
in Sierra Leone that has since prompted a similar United Nations intervention. Thus, 
failed state problems may very well flow into other countries. Further, internal wars have 
more often ended in stalemate than in peace. 10 Therefore, "rather than a fight to the 
finish- which would come at horrendous cost to civilians... regional crises need 
competent intervention (and not just of the military sort) appropriate to local 
conditions. " 11 
The core problem is that a failed state is not a benign place. In the two cases that 
will be examined, armed conflict caused the state to fail. Once this happens, basic 
essentials such as food and health care became unavailable, resulting in widespread 
famine and disease, which in tum produce humanitarian or complex emergencies. The 
UN Charter imposes on the international community the obligation to protect 
fundamental human rights- rights that can no longer be enjoyed in failed states. When the 
intemational community has chosen not to intervene- such as in the genocide in Rwanda-
this lack of action has returned to haunt it. Therefore, while a mission may meet failure, it 
is still in the interest of the international community to intervene. 
After first determining what constitutes a failed state and how such states emerge, 
this thesis will explore the strategies available to the United Nations and other 
international actors to: 1) Prevent and conclude short-term complex emergencies in failed 
states and 2) to reconstruct failed states in the long term in order to avoid the root causes 
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of conflict. These issues will be investigated by anazlying case studies of the 
interventions in Somalia and Haiti and by a review of existing theoretical models to 
conclude with a new framework for humani~ interventions. 
As the international actor of last resort, the United Nations became involved in 
failed states throughout the 1990s. However, in the cases of Somalia and Haiti, the UN 
was unwilling to accept that intervening in failed states was different from other 
interventions. This resulted in neither mission realizing its long-term goals, and led to the 
spectacular failure of the mission in Somalia. Therefore, it is imperative to discuss what 
constitutes a failed state, the mechanisms the UN used to deal with the cases of Somalia 
and Haiti, and the new mechanisms have been proposed since these missions. 
ll. What is a Failed State? 
Failed states are states ''which cannot or will not safeguard minimal civil 
conditions for their populations: domestic peace, law and order, and good governance ... 
Failed states are juridical shells that shroud an insecure and even a dangerous condition 
domestically ... " 12 They have ceased to possess coherent identities, an agreed upon 
societal and political consensus, and governing powers strong enough to impose unity 
without this consensus. They are anarchic, with different armed self-governing groups 
controlling territory and contesting control of the central government by force. They may 
or may not still have a presence internationally. 
But how can a state, the most important element of the international geopolitical 
arena, fail? At its core, a modem state is built around three key points. Any state must 
possess a binding conception of what principles the population holds in common and 
classifies as 'the national interest'. A state must also have a physical base, some territory 
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that it alone controls. Otherwise, its citizens can never be unique and independent 
participants in the international community. And a state must have a government as an 
institutional base for the expression of its unique being. 13 
Combined with these three factors are two of lesser importance. The first is that a 
state, in order to be able to govern effectively and efficiently, must be of a certain size. 
While the exact size necessary is unknown, it is generally assumed that a state must have 
a population greater than I 00,000 to be completely viable. 14 A state must also be 
sovereign: it must be able to claim supreme authority and should have no higher level of 
political authority affecting it 1 s 
The institutional base is the government, which is not identical to the state. A 
government: 
(D]erives its just powers from the governed and generates a viable political competence that can 
and will manage, co-ordinate, and sustain security, and political, economic and social 
developmenL Legitimate governance is inherently stable because it has the political competence 
and societal support to adequately manage internal change and conflict affecting collective and 
individual well-being. 16 
The stability of a government depends on three things: its economic base and 
continued growth, its effectiveness, and its legitimacy. Effectiveness means "actual 
performance, the extent to which the system satisfies the basic functions of government as 
most of the population ... see them," while "legitimacy involves the capacity of the 
system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the 
most appropriate ones for the society."17 
However, states can exist that do not possess all these attributes. In general, a 
state's legitimacy benefits from the simple feeling that its citizens believe anything is 
better than a return to the state of nature, 11 where life was "nasty, brutish and short."19 
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Therefore, the historical record shows that a state may be viable even if it only provides 
some security, and in fact a state may pose a considerable threat to its own people, yet 
still maintain legitimacy. 20 
Then, how may a state fail? Legitimacy, John Locke argued, occurs as "the 
community put power into hands they think fit . .. "21 A state retains legitimacy by 
continuing to enjoy the support of the people, a support that may be based on a 
government pursuing 'higher' and 'nobler' purposes, 22 through binding rules, or through 
fear. 23 Similarly, a state that possesses legitimacy must "successfully [uphold] a claim to 
the exclusive regulation of the legitimate use of physical force in ensuring its rules within 
a given territorial area. "24 
An existing state that loses this legitimacy may also lose its identity. When "large 
numbers of people begin to doubt or deny the claim of government to regulate force, then 
the existing state is in peril of dissolution. "2s A government can always be challenged. 
This idea, too, evolved from Locke, who saw that a state that acts on its own authority, 
without the consent of the people, subverts the end of government. 26 
But, while changes of government occur often, and even revolutions are 
commonplace, why then are failed states so rare? A failed state will not emerge from a 
state that has developed a unifying identity, or strong institutions. Rather, it will emerge 
from weak states, which range the gauntlet from states still in the process of consolidation 
-which do not yet have political and societal consensus- to states that did not even have a 
coherent or accepted idea, nor enough power to impose unity. 27 A weak state does not yet, 
and may never have, a legitimate monopoly of ~e use of force, nor legitimacy in the eyes 
of its population. 
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This does not mean all weak states will fail. States are notoriously hardy, and 
some have existed for far longer than one would have expected without possessing any of 
the vital attributes of'stateness'. Similarly, a state may evolve. They may also continue to 
exist through international support and domestic political payoffs. Weak states in Africa 
have been characterised as ~Lame Leviathans,' defined as where the state has the capacity 
'1o incarcerate its internal enemies, tax international agencies (by threatening to 
disintegrate) but not its own population, and provide domestic order through foreign-
funded police surveillance. It also has the .capacity to reward its sycophants with 
relatively attractive employment. " 21 
A weak state becomes a failed state when the basic functions of a state are no 
longer performed. As the decisionmaking centre of government, the state is paralysed and 
inoperative. Laws that are required are not made, order is not preserved, and societal 
cohesion is not maintained. It no longer creates a unique identity. Its territorial integrity is 
no longer assured. As a political institution, it has lost its capacity to command and 
conduct public affairs. And it ceases to function as a socio-economic organisation. In 
other words, the state has lost the right to rule. 29 Further, as civil conflicts within a failed 
state increase, the state begins to replicate '1he well-known pattern of Hobbesian 
competition for security in the 'state of nature',· where no sovereign power protects fearful 
individuals from each other. In this anarchical setting prudent self-help may require 
preventive attacks to hedge against possible threats .. . "30 
m. How does such a decline occur? 
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Two different sets of criteria have been proposed to demonstrate a state's decline. 
The first set, proposed by William Zartman,31 argues that the decline of a state can be 
marked by slow failure within its government: Five signposts, of equal importance and 
unclear chronological order, can mark this: 
• Power devolves to the peripheries because the centre dissolves in internal conflict. 
• Power withers at the centre as people stop supporting or obeying government. 
• The government avoids making necessary but difficult choices. 
• Politicians practice only defensive politics, concentrating on procedural 
stratagems. 
• Finally, the centre no longer controls its agents, who begin to operate 
independently. 
The second set of criteria focuses on the state as a whole, and was proposed by 
experts at a round-table held at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre. 32 This set of criteria 
suggests that the descent of a state from normalcy to anarchy occurs through four phases 
within each of the four realms of the modem state: military, social, political, and 
economic: 
The first phase sees the emergence of threats: 
• The military ceases traditional security activities. 
• Socially, there is communal break up; a disintegration of cultural values; a 
decreased tolerance of other ethnic groups; reduced individual and collective 
security; a general perception of hopelessness; and localised or individual 
anarchic behaviour. 
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• Politically, there is a cessation of representation by government; an erosion of 
public regard for institutions; dissolution of some political borders; and the 
loss of institutionalised control mechanisms. 
The second phase of decline sees the loss of confidence in the state: 
• Militarily, there may be competing military forces; the breakdown of military 
organisations; and resistance to international assistance efforts. 
• Socially, there may be destruction of religious institutions; collapse of the 
educational system; and breakdown of the health care system. 
• Politically, there is the loss of control of the population by the leadership; no 
attempts are made to settle differences; the judicial system collapses; and there 
is the cessation of information programs. 
• Economically international finance becomes unavailable, and energy resources 
and communications systems are destroyed. 
The third phase sees institutional breakdown and the collapse of organisational 
structures: 
• The military see a disinterest in or inability to restore order and the 
accessibility of anns among the entire population increases. 
• Socially, the systematic devaluation of human rights begins; the elites depart; 
there is an inability to achieve basic subsistence and widespread disease 
occurs; there is an increased displacement of the population; and there is the 
destruction of civil and political structures. 
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• Politically, there is the existence of competing power centres and there is 
decreased attention to international opinion or affairs. 
• Economically, the commercial base becomes inactive; banks and financial 
institutions collapse; the physical infrastructure is destroyed; cunency 
circulation ceases; remittance capital is gone; and environmental degradation 
occurs. 
By its very nature, a weak state, or a failing state, is positioned somewhere within 
these three stages. A failed state is a unique case. It is a fourth phase, one of complete 
political and social collapse, extreme lawlessness, constant and widespread violence, and 
severe deprivation and starvation. 33 A failed state represents anarchy. 
IV. Are Failed States A New Pbeaomeaoa? 
Today we view failed states as a pro4uct of the end of the Cold War. Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali, the then Secretary-General of the UN, stated that "the end of the Cold War 
removed constraints that had inhibited conflict in the former Soviet Union and 
elsewhere ... The end of the Cold War seems also to have contributed to an outbreak of 
such wars in Africa ... "34 
But while the end of the Cold War may have generated this upsurge, failed states 
have existed throughout modem history. Particularly when a state has not yet 
consolidated, violence is commonplace: 
Internal war is especially likely in countries that begin the process of state building with modest 
amounts of power relative to the groups they seek to govern. Whether the focus is on the European 
civil wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries or today's conflicts in Central Europe and the 
Third World, the process of redistributing power from the periphery is often a bloody, long-term 
affair.3s 
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Similarly, the early Latin American states found that fighting long wars of 
independence left them with economic disaster, vast loss of life, little trade, and constant 
conflict:36 "From the 1820's until mid-century, political authority in Spanish America was 
weak; the state, as a central institution, did not wield much autonomous strength. "37 For 
thirty years, and much longer in some smaller states, authority was not institutionalised, 
but rather rested in the hands of individual strongmen, caudillos, who rules for as long as 
they could mobilise and arm their personal supporters. 
V. Why DOW the iJiterest iJI failed Shltes? 
If failed states are therefore not a new occurrence, why since the end of the Cold 
War has the UN and the international community focused on them? A failed state often 
becomes a complex emergency, which is "a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or 
society where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from 
internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond 
the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing UN country 
programme. "31 The institution most applicable to dealing with a complex emergency is 
the United Nations, which through widespread membership and programs, can generate 
the necessary international response to deal With the problems. combining the need for 
humanitarian assistance with political and military factors. 39 
Three trends not directly related to the emergency also contribute to the problem. 
The first is demographic. There is simply now a larger population, particularly in Africa, 
that becomes subject to displacement by these wars.40 The second is the role of the media: 
The increasingly pervasive nature of the media coverage of humanitarian catastrophes has created 
new pressures on policymakers as diaspora and political constituencies demand some form of 
response. Ease of international communications and travel will ensure lbal media-saturated 
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societies in the West have immediale access to information about such humanitarian disasters. 
Nongovernmental organizations will advocate intervention and policymakers will search for 
initiatives that respond both to issues of injustice and humanitarian need as well as to domestic 
political pressures.41 • 
The final trend is that the humanitarian response to these problems "is evolving 
from one of providing asylum in Western countries to containment of movement and 
humanitarian intervention to address the proximate causes of displacement in the states of 
origin of would-be refugees. "42 Therefore, as governments choose not to harbour more 
refugees, but are pushed by public opinion into •doing something,' the easiest solution is 
to repair the damage within the failed state itself. 
VI. The Role of the United Nations in Humanitarian Intenentioas 
Failed states beget violence because within them a security dilemma exists, as 
"each party's efforts to increase its own security reduce the security of others."43 With 
such a security dilemma, three possible solutions exist. The fust follows from Thomas 
Hobbes: "establish a sovereign authority capable of enforcing a hegemonic peace upon all 
the fearfully contending parties.',.... However, failed states occur precisely because no 
group can assume sovereign authority. Therefore, this is impossible. The second is to 
develop a solution whereby each party can protect its own security through solely 
defensive measures. While this may occur eventually in a failed state, in each case study 
presented here the belligerents still believed victory and complete control of the 
remaining state apparatus was possible.45 The third solution is to assure that the 
contending parties lock themselves into an institutional framework that guarantees each 
group's self-restraint, done either through balanced power sharing among all parties or by 
delegation of powers to an impartial authority.46 
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Given the UN's abilities within the three planks of dispute resolution: diplomacy, 
peacekeeping, and intemationallaw,47 it bas emerged as the ultimate impartial authority, 
and this is the task it sought to take on during the interventions in Somalia and Haiti. 
However, the UN was not created to fulfil this task. This change only occurred through a 
long evolution of practices. The first purpose of the UN was always seen as to preserve 
international peace and security.411 The Preamble of the Charter states that the UN was 
founded for this task and ''to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which 
twice in our lifetime bas brought untold sorrow to mankind ... "49 For these ends, the UN 
pledged to: 
practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and to unite our 
strength to maintain international ~ and security, and to ensure ... that armed force shall not be 
used, save in the common interest.~ 
However, given both the power of the Security Council embodied within the Charter, and 
the ability of the superpowers to block actions they did not agree with, the full use of the 
provisions allowed to the Council in order to maintain international peace and security 
rarely occurred. Therefore, the Council resorted to other measures to prevent conflict, 
based on the consent of belligerent member states and the deployment of lightly armed 
troops to patrol agreed upon boundaries. 51 This became known as traditional 
peacekeeping. 
A. Traditional Peacekeeping 
The first observer mission occurred in 1948,52 but it was not until the Suez crisis 
in 1956 that a true traditional peacekeeping mission was deployed. While it was 
established as little more than an improvised response to a specific occasion, 53 the 
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characteristics of the mission would become the basis for most of the peacekeeping 
missions of the Cold War. 54 
Traditional missions are "operations conducted with the consent of the belligerent 
parties, designed to maintain a negotiated truce and help promote conditions which 
support diplomatic efforts to establish a long-term peace in areas of conflict. " 55 They 
require impartiality on behalf of the UN forces, the consent of the protagonists, for the 
forces to be both non-hostile and lightly armed, and the use of force only for self-
defence. 56 Such missions had little actual power and were completely reliant on outside 
actors, in particular the Security Council for their mandate and legality, and UN Member 
States for the actual forces. They could not create peace. Rather, the conditions for a non-
violent environment had to exist before they were deployed. 57 
Traditional peacekeeping forces, therefore, assume the position of invited guest. 
Any party can revoke their invitation, and the peacekeepers cannot attempt to impose a 
peace.51 In fact, the first United Nations Emergency Force, deployed to protect the 
Egyptian-Israeli border, was forced to leave Egypt when the Egyptian government 
withdrew its consent in 1967.59 
These missions became almost benign activities. It was a method through which 
the middle powers of the world could work to prevent the expansion of conflict and 
therefore the involvement of the Security Council, which in tum would have brought 
about the involvement of the superpowers and potentially wider scale conflict. 60 Over 
time, traditional missions assumed clear tasks while deployed, such as defusing tensions, 
stabilising situations, preventing the outbreak of violent conflict, and establishing at least 
the semblance of nonnal conditions. They also acted as arbiters and mediators, even as 
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instruments of law and order where none existed. And they worked on a variety of 
humanitarian tasks, such as rebuilding infrastructure. 61 Only one peacekeeping mission 
during the Cold War violated these trends: the Congo. 
The Congo 
The United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) initially began in order to 
assist the government of the Congo in maintaining law and order after Belgium 
unilaterally deployed troops to protect Belgian _nationals in the country during a period of 
escalating conflict 62 The presence of the Belgians allowed the Congolese government to 
argue for the dispatch of UN troops to protect the country against "present external 
aggression which is a threat to international peace"- even though the main threat was 
intema1.63 
Therefore, while the Belgians quickly removed themselves after the rapid 
deployment (peacekeepers were on the ground within 48 hours of the mandate passing the 
Security Counci164} of the UN mission, the peacekeepers decided to remain to deal with 
the internal threats from the secessionist Katanga province and civil war.6s They were 
initially under the rules of traditional peacekeeping66, but rapidly were caught in an 
escalating situation that would eventually involve 20,000 peacekeeping troops and the use 
of armour and fighter aircraft. 67 
On 21 February 1961, after the UN forces were challenged repeatedly, the 
Security Council passed a resolution that urged the UN to ''take immediately all 
appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including 
arrangements for cease-fire, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of 
clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort.'a This resolution allowed the 
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UN to become a de facto actor in the conflict, and throughout the Congo the forces dealt 
with all fonns of civil UDI'eSt while trying t<? adhere to the principle of self-defence, 
thereby improving the security situation considerably by the fall of 1961.69 In Katanga, 
the UN began launching offensive strikes against the n:bel forces that eventually captured 
the two secessionist strongholds and the collapse of the movement. 70 
The Congo represented an archetype of the missions the UN would encounter in 
failed states. The country was composed of over 200 tribes, and the Belgians left the 
country unprepared to govern itself. There was virtually no sense of national identity or 
unity.'• 
Therefore, the experience in the Congo should have taught the UN four valuable 
lessons. First, it showed the dangers of mission creep, whereby a traditional peacekeeping 
mission evolved into offensive warfare, and the lightly armed peacekeepers eventually 
acquired air power. The mission drifted into peace enforcement. 72 Second, the force 
learned that while impartiality could be maintained, neutrality in such a situation could 
not. Third, deploying a fully equipped combat force to begin with would have most likely 
solved the problems more quickly, rather than giving a traditional fon:e piece-meal 
combat capability.73 Fourth, it showed the problems inherent in the UN co-ordinating 
complex operations, which suffered from logistics problems, poor co-ordination, and poor 
communication between the various headquarters. 74 
Unfortunately, while these lessons were fundamentally important, the UN was 
determined never again to undertake such a complex operation, and therefore did not 
systematically analyse the mission in any detaii. 75 The UN had drawn its line in the sand, 
and it was a line that would hold for nearly 30 years. With the end of the Cold War, 
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however, new opportunities and problems, would emerge. While the UN felt it could 
expand its role, it would once again encounter similar problems. 
B. Second Geaentioa Peacekeepiag 
The end of the Cold War and the substantial success of the Gulf War appeared to 
give the UN a broader scope for action 76• The Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 
argued that: 
[A]n opportunity has been regained to achieve the great objectives of the Charter- a United 
Nations capable of maintaining international peace and security, of securing justice and human 
rights and of promoting, in the words of the Charter, "social progress and better standards of life in 
larger freedom". This opportunity must not be sw-andered. The organisation must never again be 
crippled as it was in the era that has now passed. 
He suggested that the UN could become a central instrument for the prevention 
and resolution of conflicts and should therefore have five aims: To seek to identify at the 
earliest possible state situations that could produce conflict, and, through diplomacy, 
remove the sources of danger; to engage in peacemaking aimed at resolving the issues 
that lead to or create conflict; to use peacekeeping forces to work to preserve peace where 
fighting has ceased and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the 
peacemakers; to assist in peacebuilding by rebuilding institutions and infrastructures 
destroyed by war and to build the bonds of peaceful mutual benefits among countries 
formerly at war; and fmally to address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, 
social injustice and political oppression. 78 
In hindsight, the Gulf War proved to be an atypical scenario, and the vision of the 
Secretary-General was based on the natural but unrealistic optimism that emerged from 
the end of the Cold War.79 But the blueprint laid out in the Agenda for Peace would be 
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used substantially, and would dramatically expand the UN's role in troubled countries-
particularly those that had fragmented and experienced internal wars due to the end of the 
Cold War.S0 
By adopting such a wide and varied role, the UN had to enter into areas that 
previously had been sacrosanct. The result was two-fold. First, the issue of sovereignty, 
while no longer overpowering, still prevented the UN from acting decisively in these 
cases. Further, the UN was now directly entering countries where the belligerents were 
not committed to any form of peace or negotiations.11 
These problems were tempered by the fact that the United States had redefined its 
interests, and was now prepared to work more closely with international organisations. As 
Warren Christopher, then U.S. Secretary of State, put it, ''working with others gives us an 
option in humanitarian and political crises when the only other alternatives -acting alone 
or doing nothing- are often unacceptable. It permits us to influence events without 
assuming all the risks and costs. "12 
The direct effects of both the Agenda for Peace and this new U.S. policy direction 
were that the UN gradually adopted two new forms of intervention on top of the more 
traditional methods it had previously used. Traditional tools under Chapter VI of the 
Charter are still used and are focused on the peaceful resolution of disputes, rather than on 
clear enforcement measures or under the guise of adding international peace and 
security.S3 But the UN now also uses peace enforcement and humanitarian support 
missions, which can be full scale interventions under Chapter VII of the Charter. 
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Table 11-1: Typology of Humanitarian Suppon and Peace Operations 
Mandate Rules of Peace Accord Degree of Size and Complexity 
Eu~ment Opposition 
Preventive Ac:tion None No None- Envoy seen Very small 
as impanial 
Peacemaking Self-Defence only No; Incipient None- Peace Force Small (under 500) 
(Ch. VI) seen as impartial Observers/Mission 
SuPPOrt 
Peacekeeping Self-defence, Yes None- Peace Fon:e Medium (500-6,000) 
Observation. seen as impartial Observers, some 
Verification peace building 
Peace Enforcement Use of all No Peace Force seen Large 
necessary means as antagonist Offensive combat 
(Ch. VII) capability 
Humanitarian Variable (Ch. VI, Variable Variable Variable 
~ VII) 
Source: StrategiC Assessment 1996: Elements of U.S. Power, Chapter II: Pe«e Organua11ons and 
Humanitarian Support www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/sa96/sa96ch ll.hbnl ( 13 October 2000), 2. 
Chapter VI of the UN Charter gives the UN, under the auspices of the Security 
Council, the power to investigate a dispute or to call upon parties to a dispute that 
threatens international peace and security to settle their differences through "negotiation, 
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional 
agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. "84 It further gives 
the Security Council the ability to take action should a conflict not be peacefully settled, 
or to make recommendations to the parties in an effort to end the situation. 85 But the 
actions available under Chapter VI are considerably restrained. Any action requires the 
consent of the parties, and must be circumspect. Thus, the tenets of traditional 
peacekeeping were reborn and then modified in the 1990s. 
l. Preventive Action 
Preventive action consists of the UN taking action to prevent disputes from arising 
between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating, and to limit the spread of 
disputes if they occur. 86 The UN has a variety of measures to use for preventive action: 
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negotiations, which can include the Secretary-General's good offices, the appointment of 
mediators; missions, which revolve around fact-finding and goodwill; and targeted 
economic sanctions.87 Negotiation and mediation, especially, are often conducted directly 
by member states, which generally have better track records than the UN.88 
l. Peacemaking 
Once conflict has broken out, the UN can use peacemaking policies, ''the use of 
diplomatic means to persuade parties in conflict to cease hostilities and to negotiate a 
peaceful settlement of their dispute... [Peacemaking] excludes the use of force against 
one of the parties to enforce an end to hostilities"89 Peacemaking is usually performed by 
mediators, diplomats and politicians, and combines negotiation with non-military tools of 
coercion, which may include threats of deployment.90 
The UN has also experimented with preventive deployment of troops, which 
stations lightly armed troops as a trip-wire to deter the spread of conflict.91 Currently, the 
UN Preventive Deployment Mission in Macedonia remains the only mission so launched, 
but is believed to have, until recently at least, contributed greatly to the peace and 
stability of Macedonia and the southern Balkans, and was considered a success. 92 
3. Traditional Peacekeeping 
The UN continues to make use of traditional peacekeeping methods, whereby 
impartial military observers verify implementation of either a cease-fire or monitor the 
separation ofbeUigerent forces.93 New missions such as the UN operation in El Salvador 
in 1991, in Mozambique in 1992, and in Angola in 1995 continued to follow traditional 
methods and numerous observer missions have been ongoing for a number of years. 94 
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C. Chapter VO Missions 
The UN has also launched missions that either straddled or entered the territory of 
a 'Chapter Vll' mandate. Such missions fall under Article 39 of the Charter, which says 
that ''the Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace; breach 
of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations ... to maintain or 
restore international peace and security. "95 Chapter VD missions can occur in different 
ways: Missions can be launched in the event of a humanitarian emergency within a 
country, due to severe civil war, or as collective security enforcement operations. 
Until 1992, Chapter Vll missions had only occurred twice: during the Korean War 
and the Gulf War. These were both collective security enforcement operations. 
Humanitarianism was not accepted as a reason for an intervention because UN actions 
were believed to be bound by Article 2 of the Charter, which argues that the UN shall not 
intervene in areas that are the domestic jurisdiction of any state. Therefore, the principal 
of sovereignty remained near absolute. 96 
With the end of the Cold War, however, the UN sought to expand its presence in 
the areaofhuman rights, encompassed in Article 55 of the Charter: 
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are neeessary for 
peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote... universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms ... 97 
This article is controversial because of the suggestion that state violations of 
human rights are not solely within domestic jurisdiction, but are rather something that 
must involve international organisations. While this does not license wholesale 
intervention in the states (nor would the Security Council support such actions), it does 
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leave the door open to question the soverei~ prerogatives of the worst violators.91 In 
essence, the UN was willing to alter the norm for intervening in a state. 
Originally, the UN would do so only with the consent of the legal government of 
the target state or due to valid reasons of international peace and securicy99 -which in the 
Cold War boiled down to invasions of member states. But with the end of the Cold War, 
the UN chose to launch interventions for the controversial principle of humanitarianism, 
or to "protect the population of the target state (or segments of it) from grave abuses at 
the hands of their own government or anti-government rebels or as a result of domestic 
anarchy."100 Thus the principal of humanitarian interventions, or ''the threat or use of 
force by a state, group of states, or international organisation primarily for the purpose of 
protecting the nationals of the target state from-widespread deprivations of internationally 
recognised human rights,"101 was born. 
The UN Charter forbids such action, however, unless authorized by the Security 
Council under Chapter VII: 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters 
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to 
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice 
the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII. 101 
Therefore, by invoking Chapter VII, or arguing that an intervention is in the interest of 
international peace and security, the UN can launch a peace mission without the consent 
of the sovereign power of a state. 103 While the UN will argue that the language of Anicle 
2 is still in effect, the concept of domestic jurisdiction and sovereignty has changed in 
substance, if not also in law.104 
Orchard 23 
Dealing with complex emergencies has resulted in the UN choosing to launch full 
scale humanitarian interventions which are based around two newer concepts for the UN: 
peace enforcement and humanitarian support operations. 
1. Peace Eaforcemeat 
Peace enforcement missions are "military operations (including possible combat 
actions) in support of diplomatic efforts to restore peace between belligerents who may 
not be consenting to intervention and who may be engaged in combat activities."105 Peace 
enforcement missions generally do not have the consent of all or even any of the parties 
to the conflict, and must be designed to exercise a wide range of combat capabilities in 
order to force a cease fire on the combatants. 106 
However, peace enforcement missions are also constrained. While they may 
prepare to fight a war, they must still be governed by "political factors designed to bring 
warring parties to the negotiating table ... (peace enforcement] cannot, in and of itself, 
create the conditions for lasting peace, which involves the political embrace of peace as 
more ~tive than war."107 
Peace enforcement missions have far larger mandated forces than traditional 
peacekeeping missions in order to ensure a proper combat capability, and they rely much 
more on the importance of force. The peacekeepers are often deployed not only with 
personal weapons for self-defence, but also with most high-intensity warfare equipment, 
including support weapons, armoured vehicles, and air and naval support. Increasing the 
size and cost of missions also creates a proliferation of mission tasks, resulting in the 
forces embracing mandates with wide scope. The peacekeepers do not only create a safe 
and secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian supplies, but also rebuilding the 
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judicial system, infrastructure, refugee resettlement, supporting elections, disarmament 
and weapons storage, mine clearance and mine education, and the protection of safe 
areas.IOI 
handle: 
However, the sheer size of these missions make them difficult for the UN to 
[N]either the Security Council nor the Secretary-General at present has the capacity to deploy, 
direct, command and control operations for this purpose, except perhaps on a very limited scale .. . 
the experience of the last few years has demonstrated both the value that can be gained and the 
difficulties that can arise when the Security Council entrusts enforcement tasks to groups of 
Member States. On the positive side, this arrangement provides the organization with an 
enforcement capacity it would not otherwise have and is greatly preferable to the unilateral use of 
force by Member States without refcrenc:c to the United Nations. On the other hand, the 
arrangement can have a negative impact on the Organization's stature and credibility . .. 109 
When the UN chooses to launch a ~e enforcement mission, it has generally 
subcontracted them to other organisations, for example NATO in the former Yugoslavia 
and the United States-led missions in Somalia and Haiti. This occurs because the UN 
does not have the necessary capacity to carry out these operations, and it is left to the 
member states or other regional organisations to do so. Thus the UN is already witnessing 
a new division of labour, where ''the regional organisation carries the main burden but a 
small United Nations operation supports it and verifies that it is functioning in a manner 
consistent with positions adopted by the Security Council."110 This results in the UN's 
stature and overall role often being lessened, and creates co-ordination problems between 
the various national and international organisations involved. 111 
2. Humanitarian Support Operations 
Humanitarian support operations are the other tool that the UN now uses. They 
entail conducting, assisting, or safeguarding the delivery of food and medical supplies and 
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the activities of non-governmental organisations (NOOs). While such missions were 
undertaken during the Cold War only infrequently and usually as an afterthought, they are 
now being undertaken with increasing frequency and scope by the UN and other regional 
organisations in order to reduce deaths and alleviate human suffering on a massive scale 
during complex emergencies. Major UN missions that have had a humanitarian support 
component include Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda," Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the former 
Yugoslavia. 112 While involvement generally starts with civilian NGOs, the sheer scale of 
many of the operations in the 1990s often overwhelmed these actors and required 
growing involvement by the military. 113 
Complex emergencies vary in scope, scale, duration, and international attention 
received; however they do share a number of analytical characteristics. They tend to 
emerge from internal conflicts. They also tend to be multifaceted in nature, characterised 
by political conflict and a simultaneous process of social, economic, environmental and 
cultural disintegration. They also tend to result in large-scale forced migrations. Finally, 
because of the migrations, they tend to be international in nature, drawing in other 
countries and international organisations. 114 
In these situations, NGOs have begun to wield considerable power. They are often 
present in the crisis area before the UN, and in most failed and weak states, ''NGOs have 
become major sources of employment and income."115 This in tum has meant a closer 
relationship with the UN, "especially in the provision of humanitarian relief in conflict 
situations and in post-conflict peace-building."116 However, NGOs do not operate by the 
same rules as military forces or international governmental organisations. It has been 
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suggested that for humanitarian actors to s~ they must follow eight guiding 
principles: 
• To relieve as quickly as possible life-threatening suffering. 117 
• To ad in accordance with proportionality: "humanitarian action should 
correspond to the degree of suffering, wherever it occurs."111 
• Humanitarian efforts must be non-partisan, and relief is "compromised when 
political considerations are injected into lifesaving ministrations."119 
• Independence, or the freedom to act without interference, is required. 120 
• Accountability is also required. Actors must be accountable both to their 
sponsors and beneficiaries. 121 
• Appropriateness: action should be tailored to local circumstances. 122 
• Context: effective humanitarian action ~'should include a comprehensive view 
of overall needs and of the impact of outside efforts."123 
• When suffering occurs, sovereignty must not be taken as absolute. "When 
sovereignty and sufff:ring clash, the latter should prevail."124 
Too often within complex emergencies, these principles either fall by the wayside 
or are not understood by all actors. 
Similarly, military involvement is both beneficial and cumbersome for the UN. It 
helps not only by providing a secure environment, but also through its unrivalled ability 
to deliver large amounts of relief at very short notice in any terrain. 125 However, 
humanitarian support operations have shown a tendency to evolve from peacekeeping 
missions into Chapter VII peace enforcement missions when the traditional methods do 
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not work. 126 This often results in humanitarian principles being ignored by the command 
structure, and thereby placing NGOs in a poor position with regards to their 
accountability. Similarly, the involvement of the military very quickly challenges any 
attempts by NGOs to be non-partisan or act without interference.127 Finally, management 
often becomes problematic, because military ~d civilian agencies often have different 
goals and government decisions regarding troop deployment can be capriciously taken 
back once casualties start mounting. 128 
The main result of these two changes has been that the UN has intervened in 
countries that would simply have not been on the agenda ten years ago. However, as these 
operations have become larger, they also become more complicated. This leaves the UN 
in the position of having to deal directly with both member states and NGOs, groups that 
are vital to any mission, but which have very dissimilar interests. And the UN is not and 
cannot be in a position to control them. 
VD. Long-Term Questions 
With the failure of interventions in both Somalia and Haiti, many questions have 
been raised by the UN and other international actors about the viability of humanitarian 
interventions. The US in particular has been far less supportive of such measures: ''[T]he 
United States must also consider many issues - such as financial cost, diversion of 
national military resources for other missions, the risk of casualties and the fragility of 
domestic and international support for peace operations - in the context of whether 
participating furthers important nation interests."129 This does not mean the 
interventionism is completely dead. Joseph Nye has argued that the national interest can 
be altered: 
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The national interest is simply the set of shared priorities regarding relations with the rest of the 
world. It is broader than strategic interests, though they are pan of it. It can include values such as 
human rights and democracy, if the public feels that those values are so important to its identity 
that it is willing to pay a price to promote them. 130 
However, he suggests that the US now focuses too much on the Somalias and 
Haitis of the world, which are "contingencies that indirectly affect U.S. security but do 
not directly threaten U.S. interests."131 Somalia proved that Americans are reluctant to 
accept casualties in cases where the only foreign policy goals are humanitarian interests. 
In such cases, Nye feels the U.S. should avoid the use of force except where its 
humanitarian interests are reinforced by the existence of other strong national interests. 132 
There have also been harsh critics of this apparent attempt to return to 
humanitarian isolationism. Chester Crocker; for example, argues that rather than 
examining the more esoteric ramifications of American national interests and foreign 
policy, it is the actual record of the U.S. peace operations that is worthy of criticism. 
Similarly, he argues it is important to see that Somalia itself resulted in a larger regional 
security instability, and that the failure in Somalia resulted directly in the tragic case of 
Rwanda.t33 
Certainly, the "springtime of intervention" has ended. Civilian humanitarians 
argue that military force actually complicates their work. In the short run, it ''works 
against the impartiality, neutrality, and consent that have traditionally underpinned their 
work; and in the long run, it addresses none of the structural problems or root causes that 
had let to the eruption ofviolence."134 
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Perhaps what is needed is a new theoretical framework. Since the failure of the 
missions in Somalia and Haiti, a variety of international actors have attempted to create 
frameworks that would attempt to deal with the problems these two missions highlighted. 
A. The Uaited Nations 
I. Preventive Action 
Boutros Boutros Gbali, in one of the last documents be wrote as Secretary· 
General, argued that the UN has learned several important lessons from its failures. Each 
state decides its own path and creates its own political culture, therefore each state must 
find its own institutional balance between the state and civil society, and therefore any 
attempts to support democracy must also be coupled with development.135 The UN, when 
choosing to intervene in a country, must understand that institution building is 
considerably more complex than merely holding elections. The most important role is that 
of co.ordination, in order to avoid waste, duplication, and conflicting advice, and the UN, 
which maintains global capabilities, is wen placed to facilitate proper co.ordination.136 
Kofi Annan, upon becoming Secretary·General, also understood that change was 
necessary. The UN's capacity continues to be hobbled by the failure of Somalia. Because 
of that failure, the UN can no longer respond swiftly and decisively to crises, and that this 
initial failure directly led to the inaction of the international community during the 
genocide in Rwanda. 137 However, focusing on preventive deployment, preventive action 
and traditional peacekeeping is an active policy aimed at nipping violent conflict in the 
bud.t31 
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2. Peace Operations 
The UN also engaged in a comprehensive review of all peace operations139, 
chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi, who earlier was the popular Special Representative of the 
Secretary General {SRSG) in Haiti. The report made wide sweeping prescriptions for 
change within the UN hierarchy, arguing that: 
[F]or preventive initiatives to reduce tension and avert conflict, the Secmary-General needs clear, 
strong and sustained political support tiom member states ... no amount of good intentions can 
substitute for the fUndamental ability to project credible force. However, fo.u alone cannot create 
peace; it can only create a space in which peace can be built. In other words, the key conditions for 
the success of future complex operations are political support, rapid deployment with a robust 
fo.u posture and a sound peace-building strategy. 140 
While the UN bas expertise in traditional peacekeeping operations, it does not 
have the capacity needed to deploy more complex operations rapidly and to sustain them 
effectively. 141 Rather, in such an operation, it must be the goal of peacekeepers to 
maintain a secure local environment, while the peacebuilders work to render that 
environment self-sustaining. 142 In cases where peacekeepers are deployed, they must have 
a mandate that is clear in order to ensure unity of effort in potentially dangerous situations 
and have rules of engagement that are robust enough to ensure that the UN contingents do 
not cede the initiative to their attackers.143 
In complex operations, moreover, there is also a requirement to define properly 
and identify the elements of peace building. In order to rebuild a country, peacebuilding 
requires engagement with local parties. Free ~d fair elections should be viewed only as 
part of a broader attempt to strengthen government institutions. Civilian police monitors 
must be tasked to reform, train, and restructure the local police and ensure that the courts 
become politically impartial and free from intimidation. The protection of human rights is 
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necessary in order to ensure national reconciliation. Finally, the disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants is key to post-conflict stability. 144 
The report accurately portrays most of the requirements for an intervention in a 
complex emergency. The only concern is that by tasking peacekeepers to keep only the 
peace, it may walk down the road faced in Somalia, where the forces did not engage in 
anything more complex than securing the overall environment, leaving the aid agencies at 
risk. 
B. Ot•er T•eeretieal Models 
1. Patterns of Peacebuilding 
The Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAin 
bas created its own peacebuilding hierarchy that pinpoints substantially different 
concerns, and is focused around three levels of conflict: Post-colonial, post Cold War, and 
"independent conflict which does not finds its origins and characteristics in systemic or 
international causes, but rather is focused in~ and occurs in a predominantly national, 
unilateral manner,"145 or failed states. 
When peace does occur, it is not because of the influence of foreign actors, but 
rather "originat[es] domestically. Foreign actors can encourage and facilitate this 
process, but the idea of the conflict being "ripe" for settlement is vital for a successful 
peacebuilding process."146 When this occurs, security should be limited to ensuring the 
cease-fire, and elections must be held quickly in order to establish the credibility of the 
process. 
Once these first steps are taken, the next set of steps involves the building of 
domestic capacity: This "must occur in the NGO sector in order to create mechanisms to 
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balance the role of the government as well as assist it in the implementation of economic 
and social reconstruction efforts."147 Then. the international community can focus on 
both reconstruction and demobilisation.148 
But this model is not expanding on the lessons from failed states in order to solve 
them faster. Rather it is merely saying that failed states are difficult to work in, and 
therefore, they should be left alone until peace appears ripe. In some cases, this may be 
the correct attitude. However, failed states that descend into complex emergencies can 
and should not be left alone. 
2. A Legitimate Governance Theory of Engagement 
The United States military bas also focused on the problems of deploying 
peacekeepers in an effort to address the previous failures. The U.S. framework suggests 
that interventions in failed states can not be determined by the results of military or police 
actions, but mther depend on: 
a protracted, multistage use of political, economic, and moral as well as physical effons to gain 
influenc:e over or control of the society and its political system. In short, success depends on the 
ability to achieve political competence and legitimacy. 149 
The first step is to try and strengthen failing states through outside help in the 
short term and create a stronger foundation for the state in the long term. In order to 
succeed, a state's government and institutions require help to create legitimacy, in 
economic development, and in sheer competency. 1 so This will result in increased stability. 
It is important to realise that, in such cases: 
experience shows that the long-term commitment of human, financial, and other resources can be 
staggering... experience also demonstrated that ignoring an instability problem or only providing 
short-term and cosmetic solutions to a related threat can be debilitating. Because instability in one 
place can cause inscabilities elsewhere, related threats can ultimately become directly menacing to 
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the United States... Failure to recognise and deal with a threat in its early stages is a threat in 
itself.UI 
Thus stability depends on three tactors: military-police capability, economic 
capacity and political competence, with political competence as the most imponanL 
Focusing solely on the military-police capability and economic capacity in the hope of 
creating political competence results in failure. Political competence will not develop by 
itself. Therefore, in order to ensure stability, a state must focus on the free, fair and 
frequent selection of leaders; the level of participation in or acceptance of the political 
process; the level of corruption; the level of political, economic, and social development; 
and finally the level of regime acceptance by major social institutions. 152 
This framework has two important assumptions. Firstly, that an intervention, in 
order to succeed, must remain for the long term. Secondly, that a mission must focus on 
creating political competence in a state. Long-term interventions harken back to previous 
U.S. policy, such as the intervention in Haiti from 1915 to 1934. It is positive because by 
accepting long term interventions, the U.S. will become more likely both to participate in 
them, and to engage in nation-building activities. Focusing on political competence is also 
imponant, since it suggests that merely creating new democratic elections may not help in 
the long run, and that a state, rather, will need substantial help. 
However, this also opens a potential quagmire. Earlier U.S. interventions in Haiti, 
Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic were exercises in imperialism. Similarly, such 
policies may result in leaders gaining power due to their support for the intervention and 
the intervener, rather than due to their natural abilities. Further, a long-term intervention 
may also open up the intervention forces to charges of neo-colonialism and even to 
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· national 'liberation' movements being created. Therefore, such a strategy, while 
beneficial, must ensure that the intervention force maintains its own neutrality and 
popular support from the population. 
3. New Peacekeeping Partnership 
The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre also created its own set of recommendations, 
suggesting that there is a need for all the groups involved in failed state interventions- the 
military and police, NGOs, the UN and other IGOs, diplomats, and the media- to engage 
in what they term the new peacekeeping partnership, a continuous co-operative effort to 
co-ordinate activities.153 This is certainly an_ excellent idea, and the centre, through 
extensive courses and workshops, is attempting to make it a reality. 
It suggests that the "earlier interventions are implemented, the greater their 
effectiveness."154 Interventions therefore should begin on the diplomatic level and 
become progressively larger as the state stumbles down the downward spiral, progressing 
from a UN envoy, to a UN mandate to a Chapter VI mission to finally a Chapter VII 
mission in a failed state. 1 ss 
This certainly is relevant to the problems of Somalia and Haiti. In both cases, 
earlier interventions could well have solved the problems with less force. However, it also 
sees the danger of a traditional peacekeeping operation being deployed into a country 
where it simply does not have adequate powet, therefore lessening the credibility of the 
international actors. 
VID. Coaclusioas 
While failed states may not be a new phenomenon, only since the end of the Cold 
War has the international community been in a position where it could effectively 
Orchard 35 
intervene in them to prevent or halt complex emergencies. But while humanitarian 
support missions have become commonplace, humanitarian interventions have proven far 
more difficult to get right. 
Initially, these problems were caused ~y a lack of theoretical understanding of 
how to deal with failed states. With the failure of the missions in Somalia and Haiti, there 
was an attempt by a number of international actors to create this understanding, and 
improve the methods by which the international community can launch humanitarian 
interventions. 
But these new models do not take into account all the problems that the 
international community faced in Haiti and Somalia. Similarly, even with this new 
theoretical basis, the UN continues to make the same mistakes. The rest of this thesis will 
therefore examine in detail the UN missions to Somalia and Haiti, then conclude with a 
brief examination of the mission to Sierra Leone and present a revised humanitarian 
intervention framework. 
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Chapter Ill Somalia 
Somalia represents the first time in the post-Cold War era that the United Nations 
intervened in a failed state. It is also the first t4De a Chapter VII mission was launched by 
the UN to further hwnanitarian goals, rather than the principles of collective security. 
By the time of the UN intervention, the Somalia state had completely failed. The 
Somalis suffered from inadequate nutrition, rudimentary health services, poor access to 
safe-drinking water and sanitation, and faced widespread famine and disease even at the 
best of times. 1 By 1992, however, the onset of war coupled with the collapse of the 
government and institutional infrastructure, all at the time of a drought, had ushered in a 
disastrous catastrophe. Somalia was a complex emergency. Almost 4.5 million people, 
more than half the total population, were threatened with starvation, severe malnutrition 
and related diseases. Some 300,000 people were estimated to have died that year. 2 
Seventy percent of the country's livestock bad been lost, its fanning areas devasta~ and 
some 500,000 people were in refugee camps in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti.3 
This failure emerged due to a number of intertwined problems. To begin with, the 
clan structure of society in the country ensured that the early governments could not exert 
a form of centralised control. Then, the Siad Barre regime, which ruled before the failure, 
was prone to the worst vices of dictators: an autocratic regime based around a personality 
cult, patronage, corruption, and support of some clans over others. Finally, the huge 
number of refugees that Somalia accepted after the Ogaden war (1977-78) produced 
dependence on aid that caused fundamental refonns to cease and produced a culture of 
theft. 
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I. A Historical Background to State Failure in Somalia 
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- Eighteenth Century: Somalis are Islamic nomadic pastoralists, 5 who have a 
complex clan structure. There are six different Clan-Families, embracing twenty-one 
different clans. 6 The clans are an integral part of Somali society with elders and chiefs 
wielding substantial power and individual clans claiming traditional territories. 7 At the 
end of the nineteenth century, Somalia becomes vital due to its position on the Red Sea 
and its proximity to the Suez Canal. Great Britain, France and Italy divide its territory 
into five parts. 8 
Independence: 1 July 1960: 
The independent Somali republic is established by the combination of British and 
Italian Somaililands. For nine years, it is ruled under a parliamentary system wrought 
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with instability and violence as the government and the clan structures fight for political 
positions and state resources. 
Barre Assumes Power: 1969·1977 
Following the assassination of the President on 21 October 1969, the military 
stages a coup and a new government is formed, headed by General Mohamed Siad Barre. 9 
. New institutional mechanisms result in further powers going to the clans. 10 Barre is a 
staunch supporter of pan-Somalism, the belief that all Somalis should be unified into one 
country, 11 and follows a socialist path in an attempt to reorganise society by eliminating 
clan consciousness. He also seeks the aid of the Soviet Union, and receives aid and 
advisers. 12 However, he increases his own personal power by fostering both a personality 
cult based around himself as the 'Victorious Leader,' and by producing his own uniquely 
Somali path to socialist revolution in his little blue-and-white book. He begins to favour 
some clans, particularly his own and his family~s. 13 
Barre's Regime Withen Away: 1978- 1991 
Between 1977 and 1978, Somalia launches an unsuccessful war against Ethiopia 
in an attempt to regain the Ogaden region. The Soviet Union abandons Somalia for 
Ethiopia, Somalia becomes an international pariah, 14 and much of the Somalia National 
Army is destroyed. 15 The defeat marks the end of Somali im:dentism as the sole unifying 
factor in Somali politics, 16 and a failed coup by dissatisfied Somali National Army 
officers leads to the formation of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) in 
northeast Somalia. 17 This becomes open warfare in 1981 as the Somali National 
Movement (SNM) is launched in the northwest. 11 
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The insurrection causes Barre to rely increasingly on his family clans while 
marginalizing the others. 19 He also uses patronage to appoint other supporters to the 
highest positions, and allows them to embezzle funds, 20 and he attempts to rebuild the 
Somali National Army with military aid from the United States.21 While fighting the 
insurrection, the military becomes dependent on supplies of food aid ear-marked for the 
refugee population, whose numbers are severely over-represented. 22 Other aid money 
creates an. economy of dependence on humanitarian aid throughout the govemment:23 
"Military, economic, and food aid perpetuated a political system that was not self-
sustaining, nor did it fulfil the basic requirements of a sovereign government. "24 
Civil War: 1988-1991 
In 1988, the Issaq clan under the SNM banner launches an open rebellion against 
the Barre regime in the northwest. The SNM are able to capture Hargeisa, the region's 
largest city, and the government then destroys the city through a combination of aircraft 
and artillery.25 The human rights atrocities perpetrated by the regime against the lssaq 
cause international aid to be cancelled, 26 and the end of the Cold War means that Barre no 
longer has international cards to play.27 By 1990 this results in a virtual cessation of all 
'd28 ai. 
By 1989, it becomes apparent that Barre is prepared to enter negotiations. 
However, the opposition insists it is too late.29 In hindsight, senior US advisors suggest 
that this would have been the best time to either act as a negotiator or recruit other 
countries to put pressure on the opposition to negotiate. However, at the time it was not 
considered vital and, as Herman Cohen, the then Assistant Secretary of State for Africa 
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puts it, "we continued to have access to the port and airfield at Berbera, and the Somali 
people were 'naturally warlike,' so why panic?nJO 
In 1990, fighting spreads to central SQmalia,31 while in Mogadishu a manifesto 
calling for a national conference to reconcile the various movements and ethnic groups is 
published and signed by 144 well-known and moderate political leaders. However, there 
is no support within the rebel groups and little concerted actions in the international 
community. Nothing comes ofit.32 
In August, Iraq invades Kuwait, which leads to a quick withdrawal of U.S. interest 
from the Hom: "Thus, eleven years of US military protection from 'over the horizon' 
evaporated as the threatened countries welcomed US forces on their own territories. 
Military facilities in east Africa suddenly diminished in importance."33 The U.S. quickly 
halted all economic assistance to the Barre regime. 34 
In January, 1991, Barre flees south ftotn Mogadishu with a rump force after the 
army collapses.35 The USC assumes control of the city, and appointed several of the 
signatories to the manifesto to provisional positions. Ali Mahdi, a member of the Abgal, 
is appointed president, but is rejected by other groups, including General Mohamed Farah 
Aidid of the Habr Gedir, the USC's military leader.36 Relief operations run by the UN, 
UNICEF, UNHCR, the ICRC, and other NGOs begin throughout the country even as the 
UN closes its offices in Mogadishu. 
In June and July, attempts are made by the provisional government to hold a 
national reconciliation conference, however these fall apart after only lukewarm support 
from the various rebel groups and absolutely no outside support. It bas been argued that at 
the time the UN bureaucracy dealing with multilateral affairs was suffering from 'conflict 
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fatigue:' "When the Somalia crisis exploded, the UN was already running a dozen 
peacekeeping operations on five continents. The system was saturated. "37 
The failure of the conference results in the various rebel groups breaking apart and 
starting to fight amongst themselves over the remains of the country. No central 
government exists, rival militias fight over different regions and towns, and looting and 
banditry are widespread. The SSDF takes power in the northeast. The rival factions of the 
USC fight over Mogadishu. The SNM proclaims an independent state in the northwest, 
named 'Somaliland'. In the south, the Somali National Front emerges out of the remains 
of the old Somali National Army and is led by Barre. Elsewhere, several new factions 
come into being as clans not originally involved in the fighting seek to secure their own 
territory. 38 
Somalia is no longer of interest to the U.S. and UN: "Assuming that the clan 
system would somehow find a way to bring order out of chaos, with US forces well 
accommodated directly in the Gulf, and with our embassy closed, we more or less 
dropped Somalia from our radar screens. As Ambassador Frank T. Crigler ... observed: 
'The United States turned out the lights, closed the door and forgot about the place. "'39 
UN iavolvement begias: 27 December 1991: 
Only in December 1991 does the outgoing Secretary-General of the UN, Javier 
Perez de Cuellar, begin UN involvement in Somalia by sending James Jonah as his 
special envoy to visit the area in an attempt to further reconciliation in order to allow the 
aid agencies to reach people in need. 40 
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D. Tbe UN Iatenreatioa 
Numerous NGOs and international agencies were already involved in Somalia by 
1991, including the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees 
(UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Children's Fund 
(UNICEF), which had all been there since the 1970's. However, violence hurt and then 
halted their efforts; and as Mogadishu was swept into the civil war the United Nations 
closed its offices in the country.41 Other NGOs continued their efforts, and the ICRC 
remained in the country throughout the violence. 42 The little humanitarian relief that 
continued became an important factor in the political economy of the military factions, 
who used it for their own purposes. Looting was commonplace, and factions often levied 
heavy taxes of some 10 to 20 percent on cargoes, and charged exorbitant rates for 
'protection. ' 43 
By the time the UN became involved in Somalia, they had already missed three 
opportunities when preventive action and peacemaking might have worked: when the 
SNM captured Hargeisa and Barre's government used extreme force to dislodge them; 
when the May Manifesto was published calling for national reconciliation; and finally 
when the government collapsed and the USC assumed control of Mogadishu and 
attempted a conference of national reconciliation. 44 Each of these points represented a 
time when peace was within reach. But the UN failed to take advantage of them. 
The UN also failed to understand how complex the situation was in Somalia. The 
UN displayed no real understanding of what a failed state is. Too often, it negotiated with 
the military factions as if they were the legitimate government of Somalia. This resulted 
in the UN often marginalising the very groups that it had initially set out to help. The UN 
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also failed to consider what was needed to repair and rebuild the country, and bow long 
such a project might take. Finally, there was no clear understanding of what military 
forces might be needed during a mission, with the result that too often, the UN was 
trapped in a reactive situation- reacting to what the factions wanted or did- rather than in 
advancing its own agenda. 
A. Initial Steps: Preveative Action aad PeacemakiDg 
The UN began its involvement in Somalia by using the good offices of the 
Secretary-General to send a special envoy to 89malia, backed in full by the power of the 
UN. The envoy, James Jonah, visited the area in an attempt to further reconciliation in 
order to allow aid to reach people in need. 45 Jonah was initially viewed as having taken 
sides because after arriving in Mogadishu for a single day, he met only with General 
Aidid. Further, be showed little understanding or sensitivity to the Somali people.46 
Nonetheless, he did succeed in reaching an interim agreement among the UN, the 
Organisation for African Unity (OAU) and the two main parties to the dispute in 
Mogadishu, Ali Mahdi and Aidid, which saw a cease-tire implemented and a UN 
technical team sent to Somalia. 
The technical team secured an agreement that would see the UN deploy unarmed 
peacekeepers to monitor a cease-fire between the factions, and deploy security personnel 
to protect UN personnel and operations.47 This led to the creation of the first United 
Nations Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM I) by the Security Council on 24 April 1992. 
B. Second Step: Traditioaal Peacekeeping- UNOSOM I 
UNOSOM I was composed of 50 military observers and 500 security personnel, 
who were anned and equipped with light vehicles and one annoured vehicle. The force 
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would abide by the "traditions of United Nations observer missions.""1 However, the 
mission was underequipped for its mandate. Mohamed Sbanoun, the mission's head, 
recalls: 
[H)ad limited RSOUrteS with which to work. yet we were expected to help supply food, provide 
administrative expertise and coordination for relief operations, help restore infiastructw'e and, of 
course. mediate all kinds of clan disputes. There was no military option at this stage. The UN 
mission had to rely to a large degree on moral suasion to get things done.49 
The operation encountered problems from the beginning, when the 500 Pakistani 
troops did not arrive until mid-September, a month and a half late, and were unable to 
capture control of the Mogadishu airport until November. 5° Aid agencies were able to 
expand their programs and ensure that necessary relief got through, but they could not 
guarantee the delivery of supplies overland. 51 
Further, Somali leaders consisting of local elders and clan leaders, rather than the 
military faction leaders, agreed to deal with the UN. However, they insisted on an urgent 
and large humanitarian assistance program in order to prevent the militias gaining control. 
This was aid the UN could not and did not provide. 52 
The mission failed to make any headway. A minimum of 50,000 metric tons of 
food was required for the country, but only half the amount was pledged and even less 
arrived. The few open hospitals remained totally dependent on foreign assistance. The 
sanitary situation continued to deteriorate, livestock continued to die and refugees 
continued to head into Kenya at the rate of 1,000 a day. By the end of August, Shanoun 
found that a "lack of security prevents the delivery of food, while food shortages 
contribute significantly to the level of violence and insecurity ... "53 
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To solve these problems, the UN chose to deploy a more robust peacekeeping 
force based in four zones in order to establish a presence in all areas of the country. The 
new force would have 3,500 troops- this before the first 500 had even been deployed.S4 
The four-zone model bad been proposed by the UNOSOM team in order both to 
decentralise operations, and prevent the mission becoming dependent on the conditions 
prevailing in Mogadishu, thereby preventing the mission from becoming too Mogadishu-
centred. This would favour the emergence of a new regional leadership to offset existing 
faction leaders.55 Sbanoun hoped that a poiicy of regionalization would allow the 
traditional bases of authority throughout the country- clan elders, intellectuals, religious 
leaders, and the emerging professional class- to reconstruct civil society. 56 
The change, however, did little besides upset member states. The U.S., for 
example, "bad estimated that at least 30,000 heavily armed troops would be needed. 
Neither the number of troops available- they were angered by Boutros-Ghali's plucking 
the number 3,5000 out of a hat at random- nor the mandate were designed to do the 
job. "57 The decision also undermined the position of the UN within Somalia, as none of 
the Somali leaders and elders, the surrounding countries, or UNOSOM itself were 
consulted before the announcement. 58 Worse, this proved to be an empty promise, as by 
December troop strength had reached only 564.59 
The result was a further loss of confidence in the UN. Complicating the problem 
were bizarre incidents that were not investigated of UN planes unaccountably delivering 
money and weapons to Ali Mahdi' s faction60 and rumours that the UN sought to occupy 
the country. This resulted in an increased level of violence throughout Somalia and a 
decline in relief supplies arriving at their destination. Then the forced resignation of 
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Mohamed Sbanoun, based on critical comments he had made concerning the UN, cost the 
UN even more credibility, as he had won the trust of several clan leaders. To top this off, 
the Somalis bad little respect for Boutros-Ghali, who was seen as having supported the 
Barre regime when he served as Egypt's foreign minister.61 
The result was that the consent from the factions the UN had earlier gained 
disappeared. On 28 October 1992, Aidid declared that UNOSOM would no longer be 
tolerated in Mogadishu, and on 13 November, opened fire on UNOSOM forces at the 
Mogadishu airport. 62 This was the deatbknell of UNOSOM. By 25 November 1992, the 
Security Council deemed the situation in Somalia intolerable. 63 
The Secretary-General proposed a substantial change in the mandate of 
UNOSOM, whereby the United States would temporarily assume command of the 
mission: "[T]here is now no alternative but to resort to Chapter VII of the Charter... If 
forceful action is taken it should preferably· be under United Nations command and 
control. If this is not feasible, an alternative would be an operation undertaken by 
Member States ... "64 
The Problems with UNOSOM 
UNOSOM had failed. The problems with the first mission in Somalia can be 
broken down into two areas: management and co-ordination. 
Regarding the management problem, the UN was unprepared to run such an 
operation. Supplies were slow in arriving and troops even slower. Had the initial 
peacekeepers arrived at the time the mandate was given, or even as late as September, it 
would still have been possible to create a secure delivery environment 65 
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Similarly damaging, co-ordination on all levels was equally poor. The 
headquarters in New York did not properly communicate its actions to the mission. As 
well, the various aid agencies in Somalia, including UN departments, were unwilling to 
either follow the mission's lead or to decentralise their operations in any meaningful 
way.66 
Perhaps in light of the foregoing, it has been argued that applying a traditional 
Chapter VI peacekeeping mission to the situation was inherently flawed: "The purpose of 
such a consent-based operation is to separate waning states after they have reached an 
agreement. Somalia was in the midst of internal war between faction-based warlords who 
lacked overall domestic legitimacy and respect for civilians. The application of a Chapter 
VI mandate to this crisis legitimated the warring factions as leaders ... "67 
The result was a collapse in confidence in the UN, and thus in the mission. 
Replacing Shanoun, a known and respected figure, further eroded the Somalis' faith in 
the UN. The result was that UNOSOM could not succeed in its mission with its assigned 
level of peacekeepers, under the nonns of traditional peacekeeping, and with its mandate. 
The choices were to abandon Somalia, or to expand the mission. The Security Council 
decided that the mission could not be abandoned, and therefore supported its expansion 
into a Chapter VII peace enforcement mission led by a member state, the United States. 
C. Third Step: Peace Enforcement by Prosy -UNIT AF 
The Unified Task Force, UNITAF, was created on 3 December 1992.1ts goal was 
simple: the Security Council authorised the member states, under Chapter Vll, to "use all 
necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian 
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relief operations in Somalia tt6l The implementation of the mission would be left in the 
willing bands of the U.S. government. 
This represented a sea-change in U.S.. policy towards Somalia The U.S. had 
started a humanitarian airlift operation, Provide Comfort, in August 1992, but had shown 
an unwillingness to venture further.69 The American government had also been as 
reluctant as other Western governments to use Somalia as a test case for the 
reinterpretation of Chapter VD. 70 
Conditions changed radically when President Bush lost the U.S. election in 1992. 
During his last days in office, he was no longer constrained by domestic considerations 
and as the architect of the "new world order" he wanted to achieve a lasting change in the 
U.S. position vis-a-vis peacekeeping.71 Further, by late November the humanitarian 
situation in Somalia had become such a crisis that elements within the National Security 
Council felt that it was a "challenge in which the United States could rapidly make a 
significant and tangible difference."72 Finally, within the Department of Defence, 
previous opposition had become measured support from General Colin Powell, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, 73 and a definable, feasible mission plan had emerged, 
provided it had the full support of the U.S. government. Powell, however, still wanted the 
pitfalls clearly identified and questioned whether conditions in Somalia would permit a 
smooth handoffto the UN once a secure environment was created.74 Similarly, the State 
Department felt that it would be necessary to deal with Mohammed Farah Aidid.75 
With this knowledge, the U.S. government began consulting with various 
international actors, including the Security Council, delegates from African countries, and 
members of NATO. Furthermore, the Secretary-General was fully behind the mission, as 
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he saw it solidly entrenching the UN's international security function in world opinion: 
"Unlike Bosnia, Cambodia, or Angola, Somalia had no ideological or political factors. It 
was purely humanitarian."76 1bus, when the Security Council endorsed the United States' 
offer, it was unanimous. 77 
There have been questions about how fully aware President Bush was of the 
problems of UNOSOM I, and what role public perception played in his decision. 78 This 
last issue refers to the effect that the 'sixth member of the Security Council', CNN News, 
had on the public.79 But even if hastily and without full information, the U.S. had 
committed itself. 
1. The Mission 
The U.S. mission statement clearly reflected the military's view that they were 
there solely to create a secure environment: 
When direaed by the National Command Authorities, CINCCENT [Cornmander-in.Chief, U.S. 
central command] will conduct joint/combined military operations in Somalia to secure major air 
and sea ports, to provide open and free passage of relief supplies, to provide security for relief 
convoys and relief organization operations, and to assist the United Nations/non-governmental 
organiDtions in providing humanitarian relief under UN auspices. 80 
The operation was divided into four phases, to begin with U.S. forces seizing 
Mogadishu, and then expanding their hold in the country until they had secured the 40 per 
cent of the country considered in the most trouble.81 Initially, the plan called for U.S. 
forces to reach 28,000 troops, with other nations contributing 17 ,000;82 however, only 
21,000 U.S. and 9,995 non-U.S. troops were actually committed.83 This reduction had no 
noticeable direct effect on the implementation of the mission. 
The core of UNITAF was the U.S. Joint Task Force Somalia, code-named 
Operation Restore Hope, which was organised around the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force 
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and included the I oUt Mountain Division (a light infantry division equipped with 
helicopters). The international forces included units of the elite French Foreign Legion 
and veteran units of the Australian and Canadian Armies. 84 UNIT AF was an integrated 
combined arms force and could rely on infantry, mechanised units, armour, attack 
helicopters, gunships, fighter-bombers, and naval gunfire.15 The deployment was well co-
ordinated. The lead elements of the mission anived on 10 December 1992 to begin the 
handover, 86 and the Marine Expeditionary Force was assigned as the headquarters of and 
nucleus for the mission in Mogadishu. This allowed both a continuation of relationships 
and procedures, and -most importandy- established a unity of command between the U.S. 
forces, the 20 different countries that sent forces, and the UN and NGOs.17 
The U.S. also used Ambassador Robert Oakley, their special envoy to Somalia, to 
diplomatically create a secure environment. He pursued a peacemaking agenda, whereby: 
"Our purpose would be achieved by dialogue and co-option, using implicit threats of 
coercion to buttress requests for co-operation among factions and with UNIT AF. "11 
Oakley also reminded the faction leaders that the massive firepower used during Desert 
Storm could be unleashed against them. 
As the mission got under way, Oakley succeeded in once more engaging and 
giving roles of importance to traditional community leaders. That policy was first started 
by Sbanoun but was pursued haphazardly by his successor, Ismat Kittani. The U.S. 
military presence facilitated the implementation of this policy, as local elders no longer 
needed to fear the factions.89 Further, Oakley argued that any top-down approach would 
be a recipe for failure: "We're not trying to impose something external or something from 
above on the Somalis but (to) help them develop their own institutions ... "90 
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By this strategy, therefore, UNITAF initially succeeded in its objectives. Overall, 
the force was highly effective. It arrived quickly, including a night landing of the Marine 
forces prepared for combat conditions, and was quickly reinfon:ed by the 1 o• and the 
Foreign Legion forces.91 Further, the forte quickly established its legitimacy- clear 
support for the operation from participating fortes and belligerents alike- by 
demonstrating both clear impartiality and the capability to provide security for the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance. 92 
During this period, the UN sought both to continue humanitarian relief work and 
to negotiate some form of national reconciliation. lbis second goal was secured on 1 S 
March 1993, when the leaders of 15 Somali political movements, as well as 
representatives of the UN and other international organisations met in Addis Ababa and 
created the Agreement of the First Session of the Conference of National Reconciliation 
in Somalia 93 
The Agreement consisted of four parts. The parties first agreed upon the need for 
complete and simultaneous disannament throughout the country combined with the 
establishment of a national impartial police forte. Then they acknowledged the need for 
continued relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction work. They also recognised the need to 
settle all disputes through legal and peaceful· means and to restore all illegally seized 
property. Finally, they resolved to create a body to oversee the reconstruction and 
building of democratic institutions over the following two years. 94 With the Agreement in 
place, the U.S. government felt that the handover to the UN could begin. 
UNIT AF made a significant contribution both to co-ordinating relief and military 
operations, and succeeded at least partially in co-ordinating activities with the 49 NGOs 
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in the country. However, the mission only deployed in about 40 percent of Somalia, and 
co-operation between the military and civilian forces varied considerably from area to 
area. 95 Moreover, very few of the peacek~ing elements engaged in traditional 
confidence building exercises; rather UNIT AF conceived of itself as solely a military 
operation. The result was disagreements between many of the international actors. 
2.Disagreemenls 
The UN and U.S. very quickly got into a dispute over what the mission's mandate 
entailed. From the very beginning, the Secretary-General bad stressed that the mission, in 
order to be successful, must have two key foci. First, a secure environment could only 
exist if, at least, "the heavy weapons of the organised factions are neutralised and brought 
under international control and that the irregular forces and gangs are disanned. tt96 The 
Secretary-General also felt that the operation should create a secure environment 
throughout Somalia from the outset: "It is true ·that the quantity of suffering is greatest in 
the areas where it is planned to deploy the unified command's forces in the first phases. 
But qualitatively the situation is just as bad elsewhere ... "97 
a. Disarmament 
Disarmament in panicular, and what constituted a secure environment in general, 
were a constant thorn in the two sides. It led to open disagreements between the U.S. and 
UN, with U.S. Presidential spokesman Marlin Fitzwater saying that "disarmament was 
not a stated part of our mission and that bas not changed. "98 The U.S. forces in Somalia 
agreed, with Robert Oakley arguing that the Security Council Resolution was " a clearly 
defined mission, which is to establish security conditions in Somalia to provide for the 
unintenupted flow of relief supplies. It does not include disarmament." Lieutenant 
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General Robert Johnston, Commander of the U.S. forces, supported him, saying: "people 
will need to change the terms of my mission before I get into a wholesale disarmament.'.99 
The U.S. took this position for four reasons. First, they made a clear distinction 
between humanitarian and strategic intervention. Since Somalia belonged to the former 
category, they had no wish to interfere in its domestic affairs. Second, the U.S. feared that 
systematic disarmament could involve significant casualties. lbird, Washington was wary 
of the complexity of the security environment in Somalia, and believed that under the 
circumstances, it would be impossible to fully disarm the country. Finally, the Americans 
believed a policy of active disarmament would have been potentially very expensive. 100 
The UN, by contrast, argued that a secure environment was inconceivable without 
disarmament, that any future mission would be acutely vulnerable to the factions, and that 
the work achieved during UNIT AF would be a mere band-aid exercise. 101 
When weapons-control policies were adopted, they were generally accepted, even 
welcomed, by the Somalis, and had a positive impact on the level of violence as measured 
by the number of gunshot victims admitted to hospitals.102 But these attempts, and various 
voluntary disarmament programs such as 'food for guns' and 'cash for guns' generally 
failed to create real results, simply because Somalis were unwilling to surrender their 
weapons in a still insecure environment. 103 
Still, the situation became more favourable to disarmament during the 
intervention, particularly after the Addis Ababa peace accords, in which all sides agreed 
to disarm. "Thus the U.S. could have argued that as an impartial force, it was only helping 
enforce what the Somalis themselves had decided. Indeed, many Somalis fully expected 
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to be disarmed and were surprised by the lack of action on the part of the U.S.-led 
forces." 104 
b. The Secure Eaviroameat 
Over time, the security situation in Somalia gradually deteriorated, with renewed 
fighting in Mogadishu and the southern port of Kismayu. This caused UNIT AF forces to 
begin patrolling more aggressively, and they did begin disarming Somalis carrying 
weapons openly. 105 They also started doing periodic weapon searches and confiscations. 
However, this did not constitute a comprehensive disarmament plan, and neither was it 
considered by the U.S. now to be part of its mandate. 106 
To complicate the situation further, until January 1993 Robert Oakley insisted that 
creating new local police forces was not on UNITAF's agenda. However, the expanding 
violence caused a change of face, and UNIT AF began supporting efforts to fonn a new 
police constabulary in Mogadishu which, on 6 February, saw 2,000 members deployed, 
albeit with little training. A judicial committee was also formed, with each of the two 
main factions naming an equal number of magistrates. However, "the legal process was 
fundamentally compromised by the involvement of appointees from the two warring 
factions. Neither group would permit the arrest of its own members."107 
e. Relief Problems 
There was also considerable trouble in co-ordinating operations between the 
UNIT AF forces and the UN agencies and NGOs. Because there was no government, there 
was no central co-ordinating body; therefore the U.S. military found itself in the position 
of adopting this role. "Dealing effectively with those agencies became the primary 
challenge for civil-military operations in Somalia. This was an important function 
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because the [Human Relief Operations] not only provided many of the relief supplies ... 
[but they] were on the scene prior to the arrival of our forces and long after their 
departure. ,JOI 
The operation planners realised that in this anarchic environment, relations 
between the groups would be strained, since many of the organisations were there before 
the military forces, and thereby knew the environment better. Furthermore, many civilian 
organisations have an intrinsic distrust of the military, and therefore did not want to be 
controlled by them. The U.S. military planners-therefore created two organisations to deal 
with these problems: first a centralised authority in the Civil-Military Operations Centre 
(CMOC), based in Mogadishu; and second, they divided the country into nine 
Humanitarian Relief Sectors, each with a civilian-run headquarters. 109 
The CMOC was designed to be the key co-ordinating point for the NGOs in their 
dealings with UNIT AF, including co-ordinating all requests for military support by the 
various aid agencies and acting as an interface, facilitator and co-ordination agency 
between UNITAF, the NGOs and the UNOSOM headquarters staff. 110 The leadership of 
the CMOC was the military, representatives of civil agencies, members of the U.S. Office 
of Foreign Disaster Relief and the UNOSOM co-ordinator of humanitarian operations.111 
However, the CMOC was not located in the command headquarters, which directed 
military support to NGOs, and the NGOs themselves were very dispersed, which caused 
slow communications. 
For each humanitarian relief sector, the command staff also established a 
humanitarian operations centre (HOC). Each HOC worked to develop and implement 
relief strategy, co-ordinate logistic support for the NGOs and arrange military support. 
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However, each HOC did not answer to central authority or to one another. Therefore, 
there was no central co-ordination: "The resulting command relationship could be best 
depicted by overlapping circles rather than by~ schematic diagram.."112 
'While it bas been argued that the CMOC was "an effective, innovative mechanism 
not only for operational co-ordination but to bridge the inevitable gaps between military 
and civilian perceptions,"113 there were clear problems with the system. There was no 
clear military/NGO leadership relationship. Neither group successfully grabbed the lead, 
resulting in constant negotiation with everyone involved at every step in the operation. 114 
Complicating this were the different UN and U.S. roles in the country. UNOSOM, in UN 
eyes at least, remained fully responsible for the political and humanitarian aspects of the 
mission, but the U.S. both controlled the forces and engaged in its own political activities. 
The result was that the UN representatives lacked power on the ground and became 
marginalised except at key moments like the A:ddis Ababa conference, which was in tum 
criticised by the U.S. as being impractical.115 
Also, the military officers themselves bad different views of the mission and how 
to support the NGOs. Particularly the Marines and U.S. command staffs felt that the 
military was there to assist NGOs indirectly through overall security, but to allow the 
NGOs to provide relief. By contrast the CMOC staff felt that the military was there to 
assist the NGOs both directly and indirectly. 116 
In fact, operations that saw greater military-civil co-operation not only were 
generally more successful, but also produced lower overall levels of violence. The two 
examples in the next section highlight this. 
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d. Ahenative Methods 
The l st Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment, which took control of the 
Baidoa humanitarian relief sector, bad trained extensively in civil-military relations 
before being deployed. 117 The commanding officer donned the mantle of 'military 
governor' of the sector and positioned the troops above the armed clansman by doing 
both "'aggressive' protection of humanitarian work and the 'domination' of the HRS 
through the use of static security positions, patrolling and on-call quick reaction 
forces." 111 Furthermore, the Australian gov~ent adopted a broad interpretation of the 
mandate, and included widespread disarmament. While it accepted the potential risks, the 
government stated that " we believe that for there to be an effective long-tenn solution to 
Somalia we will have to disarm the people."119 The Australians also embarked on a 
process of 'bottom up' political reconstruction by meeting with clan leaders and 
rebuilding confidence in the rule of law and the local judicial system. 120 The result was 
that the situation was not only stable, but the armed militiamen had completely 
disappeared by the time the Australians were rotated out. 121 
Similarly, the Canadian Airborne Regiment Baulegroup, deployed to the Beltet 
Huen HRS, treated it as a traditional peacekeeping operation. Thus it engaged in tasks 
that included containment of heavy weapons from all the factions, creation of a 
civil/military co-operation unit to provide technical assistance to NGOs, the reconstitution 
of the local constabulary and the judicial system, transport, and reconstruction of 
damaged inftastructure.122 Rebuilding, however, had never been the goal of UNIT AF. It 
had always remained clear on its concept of operations: "get in, distribute the food, quell 
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the famine, turnover to follow-on UN forces and leave."123 Rightly or wrongly, the U.S. 
command left the long-term goals to the UN. 
3. UNII'AF Leaves 
By March, the U.S. argued that they bad succeeded in their mission, and that a 
secure environment now existed, though to what degree was not clear. Even Robert 
Oakley admitted that "problems of banditry persisted ... several major militias had not 
been demobilised, and bidden weapons were abundant. Personal and clan tensions 
remained high ... " 124 The UN disagreed with the U.S. decision, with the Secretary-
General stating that UNIT AF forces continued to be the target of sniper and harassment 
fire. 125 Nevertheless, with the passing of the Addis Ababa accords, which secured 
agreement among Somali leaders, and the passing of Security Council Resolution 814, 
which established the UN follow-on force, UNOSOM n, UNIT AF began its transition to 
UN control, with May 1 set as the date of departure. 126 
4. Conclusions 
UNIT AF was considered by most players to have been a success, albeit a limited 
one. It had secured the major sea and airports of Somalia, ensured the safe transfer of 
relief supplies, and had halted the massive famine that had engulfed the country. 
However, its relief co-ordination with the civilian actors had been marginal at best, 
particularly in Mogadishu. Furthermore, the mission had failed to create a presence 
throughout the country, it had failed in any meaningful way to rebuild the judicial system, 
and it had chosen not to disarm the population. 
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While these seemed minor points at the time, they would ensure that UNOSOM 
0, run by the UN rather than by the U.S. but still with a dominant American presence, 
would have trouble from the beginning and eventually fail. 
D. Fourth Step: Peace Eaforcemeat ·UNOSOM D 
I. The Mandate 
UNOSOM 0 would have a far wider mandate than its predecessor did. Acting 
once more under Chapter VII of the Cbaner, its task would be to continue to provide 
humanitarian relief and other assistance, ~ well as aiding the Somali people to 
rehabilitate their political institutions, economy and promote national reconciliation. It 
would also help resettle refugees and help with mine clearing. 
It would also have an expanded role. Firstly, it was to re-establish the Somali 
police in order to assist the restoration and maintenance of law and order. Secondly, its 
mandate demanded that all Somali parties fully comply with the commitments of the 
Addis Ababa Accords, in particular the maintenance of the cease-fire and full 
disarmament. Finally, UNOSOM n was to bring these efforts to all parts of Somalia, 
rather than the forty percent previously covered by UNIT AF. 127 
On paper at least, the forces assigned to UNOSOM ll, unambiguously a peace 
enforcement mission, would consist of 28,000 ·troops, encompassing a headquarters, five 
brigades and a logistic support group. Funber, it was felt that this force required the 
ability to engage in all forms of warfare. 121 In other words, the forces deployed, albeit 
smaller than UNITAF, would have similar combat capabilities. Whether it would have 
been possible for such a force to secure peace on the ground in Somalia cannot be known. 
Orchard 65 
It would still have been forced to more actively disarm the populatio~ and expand its 
efforts throughout the entire country, with fewer men than UNITAF bad bad. 
2. The Early Problems 
Unfortunately, the force that was assembled did not have these capabilities. On 
transition day, the planned 28,000-strong forces was fielding only 14,000 troops. Its 
various combat elements would trickle into the country between May and September. 
The combat capability of the force was also significantly lower. UNIT AF had 
shown that with a large, capable, force, it was possible to impose a secure environment on 
the factions. UNOSOM n did not have the same advantages. Rather than having the bulk 
of the force being composed of one country's forces (the U.S.) and allied countries, which 
bad been trained to operate together, most UNOSOM combat elements were in a strength 
of a battalion or less, and from a variety of countries with widely differing equipment, 
training, doctrine, and leadership. Furthermore, the U.S. combat forces were reduced 
from two divisions to the brigade-sized Quick Reaction Force (QRF), which was 
composed of elements of the 1 o"' Mountain and which was under control of the UN force 
command only during emergencies.129 Finally, the force would lack the logistical support 
that UNIT AF had, with far fewer engineers and lift, scout, and attack helicopters. The 
only U.S. engineers left in Somalia, for example, were specifically assigned with 
supporting the QRF.130 
The changeover was chaotic. Among other problems, the Indian Brigade expected 
in May did not arrive until September because of political delays. Similarly, the 
Pakistanis, who assumed the U.S. Marines job of guarding Mogadishu, did not even start 
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to arrive until the last weeks of April and were not as numerous or well-equipped as the 
previous force. 131 
Furthermore, there were co-ordination difficulties. The UN believed that support 
for the mission would decline if it were seen as the U.S. dropping an insolvable problem 
onto the UN, therefore U.S. support was still required for the mission to succeed. Thus, 
Admiral Jonathan Howe, President Bush's National Security Advisor, became the Special 
Representative of the Secretary General, and Lieutenant-General Levik Bir, a Turk who 
had previously worked closely with NATO, became force commander. The result was 
that "this inevitably gave UNOSOM D a strongly American orientation which, when UN 
forces became embroiled in actual fighting, made it difficult to decide whether the 
Pentagon or Boutros-Ghali was calling the shots."132 
While UN personnel were more inclined to use the traditional methods of 
peacekeeping to resolve tensions, the U.S. personnel quickly became impatient This 
resulted in the mission quickly taking a different tum and in allegations that the U.S. in 
fact hijacked UNOSOM ll, and allowed the Force Commander ''to participate and 
acquiesce to what Admiral Howe and the Deputy Force Commander, guided by U.S. 
authorities in the Pentagon, bad already decided upon."133 
3. The Events of 5 June 1993 
Very soon after the transition occurred, it became clear that Aidid would not co-
operate with the implementation of the Addis Ababa Agreement Furthermore, in 
assuming a far more ambitious disarmament program, UNOSOM II "was a direct threat 
to the position of the clans within the local power structure and was resisted 
accordingly. nl34 
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When UNOSOM n forces approached one of the USC/SNA designated weapon 
storage facilities on the premises of Radio Mogadishu on 5 June, they came under heavy 
attack with the end result that 24 Pakistani pea£ekeepers were killed and an additional 56 
were wounded.13s The events of that day showed several key mistakes136 that would 
continue to haunt the rest of the mission. 
To begin with, the UNOSOM mission command failed to co-ordinate the 
operation properly. The military division did not consult with the political division, which 
later said that it ''would have advised against the inspection of the cantonment site close 
to the radio station ... had [it] been informed about the planned inspection."137 Even the 
few civilian political advisers who were consulted failed to grasp the implications of the 
inspection, and regarded it purely as a military mission. There were also few seasoned 
peacekeepers among the military leadership to advise on the useful practices learned 
under traditional peacekeeping. There was also a lack of useful intelligence. No one 
predicted such an attack would occur, or even knew what forces Aidid had in the area.138 
The action also created a rift within the UN forces. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, 
no one grasped that the events of that day, and the following reaction, would alter 
irrecoverably the relationship the U.S. would have with the people of Somalia. 
4. The End of Impartiality 
The direct result of the events of 5 June 1993 was that the UN Security Council 
passed Resolution 837 which strongly condemned ''the unprovoked armed attacks against 
the personnel... which appears to have been part of a calculated and premeditated series 
of cease-fire violations to prevent by intimidation the Operation from carrying out its 
mandate ... " It further, however, raised the bar by demanding for the "neutralising [of] 
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radio broadcasting systems that contribute to the violence and attacks directed against the 
Operation." And it requested that UNOSOM II be brought up to its full deployment, with 
member states contributing military support and transport on an emergency basis in order 
to take "all measures necessary against all those responsible for the armed attacks ... 
including to secure the investigation of their actions and their anest and detention for 
prosecution, trial and punishment."139 
Resolution 837 produced two results. First, it gave carte blanche to the operation 
to take any and all actions against the perpetrator, who was quickly identified through 
circumstantial evidence to be Aidid.140 Secondly, the mission would irrevocably abandon 
any pretence of being a 'neutral' force, while not having the necessary forces to assume 
the role of a combatant. In order to pursue this role, UNOSOM became increasingly 
controlled by the U.S., since "because these operations clearly outran the capabilities of 
other UNOSOM II forces, there was an immediate expansion in the use of the Quick 
Reaction Force,"141 which was under direct U.S. control. Furthermore, UNOSOM II 
headquarters was neither organised nor equipped to function as a battle staff, and 
therefore had to greatly adjust its responsibilities under pressure. 142 
As missions against Aidid began to increase in size and scope, Admiral Howe 
began "behaving as though he were the sheriff of Mogadishu, proclaim[ing] Aidid an 
outlaw, offering a reward of U.S. $20,000 for ·his capture."143 As a result UN operations 
began to concentrate too much on Aidid's capture at the expense of the reconstruction and 
disarmament programs: "In this period, some elementary but significant measures useful 
for the country's economic reconstruction failed to be taken ... General (Bruno) Loi (the 
Italian force commander) observed that as a consequence of the UN attitude Somalis' 
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expectations were frustrated, 'they just could not understand what the UN bad come to do 
in their country. "'144 
The results of this near-open warfare were that support among UN members, 
particularly the Italians, declined. Italian Prime Minister, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, accused 
''the UN of having transformed a peace mission into 'a military intervention almost as an 
end in itself, against the wishes of those who [were] carrying it out. "'145 
The Italians argued that Aidid was becoming the central, if not only, objective of 
the mission.146 They believed rather that a two-track policy was necessary, whereby ''the 
primary task was to engage in a dialogue with all Somali factions in an effort to convince 
them to lay down weapons and promote the process of social reconciliation. Only if this 
approach did not yield results, would the use of force be justified."147 The result of the 
mission's failure to follow this approach was that the Italians increasingly looked to 
Rome for verification of orders, and in fact found themselves accused by Admiral Howe 
of siding with Aidid and sabotaging efforts to ~pture him. 148 
Furthermore, the UN simply was not very good at running this type of mission, 
and while they led a number of raids on suspected Aidid hideouts and strongholds, they 
failed to capture him.149 This resulted in the U.S. truly taking the mission into their own 
hands by deploying a special forces group, Task Force Ranger, that answered to the U.S. 
Central Command, without going through already established UN or U.S. channels.'50 
However, the U.S. military command also had its hands tied, as U.S. Secretary of 
Defence Les Aspin, General Powell and members of the U.S. Congress did not want any 
further troops deployed. Thus, while the UNOSOM forces did receive the Ranger group, 
a request to deploy heavy tanks, Bradley armoured fighting vehicles, and additional 
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helicopters was denied by the US govemment151 But the military was equally remiss in 
not performing a comprehensiye reassessment of the mission as these new troops were 
being deployed and the level of violence used by both parties continued to escalate. 152 
Task Force Ranger was deployed in late July 1993 based on arguments made by 
UN officials that they simply did not have the expertise to engage in such a combat 
situation. It included elements of the Delta commandos and the U.S. Rangers, along with 
helicopter transport. 153 The Task Force was composed of elements of the best units the 
U.S. military could field, and while their first mission was bungled- with the forces 
accidentally descending on a UN compound-. their next six missions were considered 
successes. By the end of September, Aidid was actually in contact with the UN in an 
attempt to end the conflict.154 These early successes made the force decide to launch a 
larger scale mission, one that would prove to be a catastrophe. 
5. The Ranger Raid 
On 3 October 1993, the task force was dispatched to raid the Olympic Hotel, 
where Aidid was thought to be meeting with his senior lieutenants and supporters. 155 The 
mission went smoothly at first, but troops were then pinned down and suffered heavy 
casualties. 156 Nineteen U.S. soldiers were dead or missing, seventeen from Task Force 
Ranger, and eighty-four had been wounded. One Malaysian soldier was also killed and 
three wounded. In exchange, an estimated three hundred to a thousand Somalis were 
killed and at least eight hundred were wounded. 157 
Given the fact that the raid succeeded and thai the Rangers and Delta had held out for over ten 
hours against overwhelming odds before withdrawing in good order, it had to be counted as a 
victory . .. By any objective standard the siege at the Olympic Hotel should have been seen as a 
U.S. triumph, but by the alchemy of press and policy it had been turned into an incredible political 
defeat.l51 
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The short term outcome of the Ranger raid was for the U.S. to send even more 
troops, comprising a joint task force of air, naval and ground units including M1A1 tanks 
and Bradley fighting vehicles1s9 -ironically, the equipment that Montgomery had earlier 
requested but not received. The U.S. forces in Somalia even began to plan a major 
campaign against the SNA, "whose faction had been severely weakened and demoralised 
by the large losses taken in the 3 October raid."160 
Very quickly, however, domestic opinion in both the U.S. and other contributing 
countries was soured by the losses, particularly when international television showed the 
mutilated body of one of the dead helicopter crewmen dragged through the streets of 
Mogadishu by cheering Somalis.161 President Clinton announced the withdrawal of U.S. 
forces from Somalia by 31 March 1994. Furthennore, Clinton once more sent out Robert 
Oakley, ''ostensibly to lend American support to new Ethiopian and Eritrean efforts to 
broker a political settlement, in reality to secure the release of prisoners taken by Aidid's 
forces." 162 
The result was a substantial change in UN policy towards Somalia, and ironically 
saw the UN embrace the strategy previously espoused only by the Italians.163 To aid in 
this change, the USC/SNA faction declared a unilateral cessation of hostilities against all 
UNOSOM II forces after 9 October 1993.164 Peace enforcement, at least in Somalia, had 
failed, and the UN attempted to return to a traditional mandate. 
E. Fifth Step: Failure of the Mission 
The UN was not yet willing to abandon Somalia. In October, Boutros-Ghali flew 
to Somalia, and after consulting with military and civilian UNOSOM officials, Somali 
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el~ and other local governments, returned to New York and asked the Security 
Council to allow the mission to continue on an interim basis.165 
The UN Security Council decided on 4 February 1994 to have the mission focus 
solely on humanitarian assistance, and to work solely with the co-operation of the Somali 
people. Even with this renewal, however, UNOSOM was fading fast. Many of its project 
offices were being transferred to other UN organisations. 166 Negotiations, once again in 
Addis Ababa, in March reached (once again) statements forswearing violence, urging 
general disarmament, and implementing an interim government by IS May 1994. 
However this agreement, like the previous one,. came to nought. 
By May 1994, the military force was down to 19,000, and the U.S. and European 
countries that were originally part of UNOSOM II bad been replaced by forces from 
Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Malaysia, Nepal and Egypt. The force 
was far less capable, stretched very thin, and bad seen the QRF shrink to a mechanised 
company.167 Furthermore, increasingly less-than-credible reports from the mission, 
increasingly careless largesse -including money lavished on faction leaders and unofficial 
hand outs- and the theft of $4 million from a UNOSOM filing cabinet finally resulted in 
the Security Council deciding to tenninate the operation in September. 161 
F. UNOSOM Coaelusioas 
In the short run, the mission could be considered a success. Even during the 
darkest times of UNOSOM II, aid workers from over 40 NGOs were able to deliver 
assistance that would have otherwise been impossible. The UN was successfully able to 
co-ordinate humanitarian activities not only with its own operational arms but also with 
the host of other agencies, many of whom remained even once UNOSOM U departed.169 
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Infrastructure improvements also occurred. Thirty-two hospitals were operating 
by November 1993, along with 81 maternal and child health centres and 103 mobile 
vaccination teams. The amount of potable water bad increased, with the systems in 
several cities being rebuilt The agricultural industry also began to expan~ with the vital 
food production and livestock sectors being revived. And primary education was once 
more available in many areas. 170 Long term progress was also made, particularly in law 
enforcement, with almost 8,000 Somali police being recruited by May 1994.171 
However, with the departure of the final peacekeeping force in February 1995 the 
country collapsed back into warfare. The long-tenn efforts of the mission were all for 
nothing. Only in August 2000, did work progress on creating a new government with 
negotiations supported by clan representatives, local businessmen and the Islamic clergy. 
Clan allegiances to the various factions had finally withered after a decade of fighting, 172 
allowing for a proposed transitional assembly divided along clan lines: "Civil society 
groups had initially hoped to avoid this, but .... one had to be realistic about the way 
Somalia society works."173 However, it does advance some civil society goals, in 
particular 25 seats are reserved for women. 174 
m. Lessons Learned from Somalia 
A. Failures 
l.Policy 
There are, needless to say, many lessons from Somalia. At the broadest level, it is 
vital that any organisation trying to stop conflict in a failed state intervenes at a time 
appropriate for its success. The UN clearly missed three opportunities to intervene in 
Somalia before it reached an anarchic state. It is also vital that an intervener, in whatever 
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guise, both understands that a humanitarian intervention cannot be a surgical strike, but 
rather requires involvement over the long term, and that a failed state can not be treated as 
a normal country: 
The UN, being a collection of governments, found it useful to adopt the fiction that Somalia still 
existed as a state. The imperative to relate to a government, inevitably drove the U.S. and the UN 
into the hand of the warlords who, as a group, most closely approximated organised power centres 
in the country.175 
Notably, when the UN generally had the most success, it was with the envoys who 
were willing to ignore this fiction, and instead deal with the other sectors of the Somali 
culture, especially the clan elders and other local government officials who still had some 
power, and to whom the intervention was mo$t beneficial. But when the UN dealt with 
the factions, it failed to comprehend that it was dealing with groups that were at best 
ambivalent, at worst hostile, towards their intervention and progress. 
This principle also needs to be extended to the attempted reconciliation 
conferences. The UN still considers the Addis Ababa Conference, along with other 
meetings, to be one of its greatest achievements in Somalia, noting that the civil society 
of Somalia was well-included: "Although the implementation of agreements reached at 
those meetings was forestalled by subsequent developments, the agreements continued to 
serve as the major frame of reference in the political life ofSomalia."176 
This is, at best, a convenient fiction. While the Addis Ababa conference may have 
included a wide range of civil society members, it was truly only negotiated amongst the 
factions, who were then expected to abide by its recommendations. With the UNIT AF 
decision not to enforce the disannament clause, arguably the most important in the short 
tenn, the agreement was quickly reduced in importance. The second Addis Ababa 
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conference succeeded only in producing a very similar sounding agreement, one that not 
even the UN truly believed would ever be enforced. With conferences that truly do 
involve all sectors of the country- as the 2000 Agreement bas done, and as negotiations 
around the May Manifesto in 1990 would likely have done- success is much higher. 
l.Maadate 
At the mandate level, the problems were overwhelming. UNOSOM, acting as a 
traditional peacekeeping mission, had abjectly failed. But there were no systematic 
examinations of its problems. Introducing a military element under any conditions 
requires a revaluation of the parameters. But introducing one, as with UNIT AF, where the 
parties involved in the intervention are not in agreement will only lead to problems. 
Further, the adoption of Resolution 814- supported by the Clinton administration- the 
mission abruptly changed its goals from humanitarian relief to nation building.177 The UN 
and U.S. bad distinct ideas of how the mission should proceed, and unfortunately, they 
never clarified them until after the troops were deployed. 
UNIT AF had adequate forces to secure at least temporarily the area under its 
control. But since no effort was made to disarm, demobilise, and reintegrate the 
combatants, by the end of UNITAF, Somalia was gradually getting more violent. The 
areas where the peacekeeping for~s exercised their powers towards disannament, and 
notably used more traditional peacekeeping methods, had far more success, but this 
policy was not widespread. Perhaps the greatest irony during UNIT AF was that the forces 
had been deployed to protect humanitarian operations, and yet particularly the U.S. forces 
treated direct support ofNGOs to be a fonn of mission creep.178 
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The deployment of UNOSOM n into an unsecure environment was dominated by 
a complete lack of proper co-ordination for the transfer of power.179 Not only was peace 
absent, but the follow-on mission was completely unprepared. But the UN choose to 
accept the pretence that it was, and deployed a smaller, less capable force, with a far 
broader mandate. Particularly by embracing the need to disarm the population, UNOSOM 
II was setting itself up for a confrontation. However there was a failure to comprehend 
where these events would lead. Finally, the adoption of Resolution 837 destroyed any 
impartiality the mission may still have had by signalling out one faction, 180 which could 
only result in failure. Peace enforcement was new to the UN, which meant it should have 
proceeded more cautiously. Instead by UNOSOM II's policies, it directly sought out 
confrontation. 
3. Operatioaal 
At the mission's operational level, the majority of problems revolved around poor 
co-ordination. This is perhaps not surprising, based on the huge number of organisations 
involved. However, the problems were clearest in two areas: co-ordination between the 
military and civil authorities; and co-ordination within the military forces. 
The UNIT AF and UNOSOM forces did a great deal to co-ordinate efforts between 
themselves and the NGOs in Somalia But overall, these efforts failed to do their jobs 
effectively for three reasons. First, there was no clear leadership relationship. Neither the 
military nor the NGOs nor the UN could control each other's actions. Second, the 
military, particularly in Mogadishu, was often unwilling to lend direct support to the 
NGOs, and the NGOs expected a great deal more support than the military felt it could 
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offer.111 Finally, on all levels there was insufficient planning. There was little advanced 
operations planning that included both groups: 
During cease fire and disarmament planning, for example, military offic:crs committed agencies 10 
provide relief at certain sites before co-ordinating the locations and requirements with HROs. 
Similarly, agencies did not inform the military of their decision to establish sout kitchens in 
Mogadishu, even though the military may have been called upon to provide security. 1 
At the most basic level, much of this confusion emerged simply because of the far 
different doctrines under which military and civilian groups operate. One clear example 
of this was in medical care, which was provided both by the peacekeeping forces and 
NGOs such as Medecins sans Frontieres. Their actions were often poorly co-ordinated, 
resulting in both extensive duplication and different groups following differing (and 
sometimes incorrect) drug and epidemiology guidelines. But furthermore, fundamental 
differences existed in their doctrines, with the peacekeepers seeking to win over the 
'hearts and minds' of Somalis, whereas the NGOs were seeking to rebuild the capacity of 
the country to provide health care without foreign assistance. 183 
Culturally, the twain did not meet. The military forces in Somalia were frustrated 
"by what they viewed as disorganisation and waste growing out of a tendency not to 
conduct detailed planning. Individually, they saw relief workers as young, liberal, anti-
military, academic, self-righteous, incompetent, expatriated cowboys who came to an area 
for a short time to 'do good' without fully considering the consequences."184 Furthermore, 
it has been suggested that the NGOs themselves created a lot of the economic turmoil in 
Somalia themselves by providing an overabundance of cheap food that ruined the few 
fanners and artificially increased many Somalis' incomes.18s 
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But the NGOs were equally frustrated by military officers who were perceived as 
"inflexible, conservative, and bureaucratic. They found them insensitive to Somali 
suffering and viewed their concern over "mission creep" as obsessive, an excuse to do the 
minimum and go home."116 While bridging this gap may certainly be difficult, including 
NGOs more thoroughly in operations and changing each other's perceptions through 
group activities and wargames when not deployed go a long way to solve it. 
4. The Military 
The military must also shoulder a great deal of the blame. While they may have 
perceived the NGOs as disorganised, their own command structures in Somalia were a 
labyrinth of red tape: 
There should be no mistaking the fKt that the greatest obstacles to unity of command during 
UNOSOM II were imposed by the United States on itself. Especially at the end of the operation, 
these command arrangements had effectively created a condition that allowed no one to set clear, 
unambiguous priorities in designing and executing a comprehensive force package. 111 
This was complicated by the involvement of a multitude of other countries, which 
resulted in severe interoperability problems: 
UN peacekeeping operations will inherendy encounter some difficulties in command and control 
among the national units that make up the force. These include communication problems 
stemming from the use of different lan~es, the lack of common training, redundant staff 
structures, and multiple chains of command.1 
Both during UNIT AF and UNOSOM II, forces with prior peacekeeping 
experience- such as the Canadians, Australians, and Italians- generally did far better than 
the forces without it. Furthennore, when the cscalation began, the military command in 
Somalia was both lacking in officers with prior peacekeeping experience, and in the 
intelligence necessary to see where the mission would head. Therefore, it quickly 
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escalated into a near open war, thereby destroying any semblance of impartiality, but 
without the necessary force to fight such a war: 
Peacekeeping requires an adjustment of attitude an approac:h by the individual to a set of 
circumstances different &om those normally found on the field of battle- an adjustment to suit the 
needs of peaceable intervention rather than of an enforcement action. 119 
IV. Coneluions 
In Somalia, the UN used all four peacekeeping tools that it bad at its disposal. It 
began with preventive action, through the use of envoys. It then went to peacemaking, 
where the UN negotiated entrance for a force into Somalia. It then proceeded to 
traditional peacekeeping, under UNOSOM I, which failed. It then proceeded to peace 
enforcement, first under the auspices of the U.S., then under the auspices of the UN. This, 
too, failed. 1be result was an eventual complete retreat from Somalia, without solving any 
of its long-term problems. 
Somalia shows the problems involved whenever the international community 
decides to intervene in a country- for whatevet: reason- without establishing a conceptual 
basis and understanding of the current situation. Furthennore, a mission requires a 
workable mandate with adequate forces deployed in a timely manner. It also requires 
clear co-ordination between all actors. Finally, a mission can not abandon the tenets of 
traditional peacekeeping without having adequate forces to do the job. 
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Chapter IV. Haiti 
When Haiti collapsed, it appeared to be a chance for the UN to salvage the idea of 
humanitarian interventions in failed states. After the newly elected democratic 
government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide was overthrown by a military coup in 1991, the 
international community was quick to react to what it perceived as a potential 
humanitarian emergency. The United States also became interested, both because of 
recent history and because of Haiti's proximity to the U.S. and the potential for refugee 
flows. The result was the UN attempting, first diplomacy, then a traditional peacekeeping 
mission, both of which met with failure. The UN then approved a U.S-led peace 
enforcement mission to establish a secure environment, aid humanitarian efforts, and 
begin institutional reconstruction. 
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By the time the UN intervened in Haiti, the government, through a combination of 
its own incompetence and international sanctions bad ceased to function and NGOs were 
forced to assume the provision of social services. The ruling junta committed widespread 
human rights abuses. The economy had all but collapsed. This, coupled with massive 
refugee flows to the sunounding islands and the United States, created a complex 
emergency that needed immediate, widespread, and long-term help. 
But Haiti has a history even more complicated than Somalia's. While the 
intervention appeared to be a chance to repair the damage to international prestige that 
was generated by the full scale failure of Somalia, the lessons from that failure were not 
applied. Like Somalia, a great deal of Haiti's .troubles stemmed from the fact that Haiti 
was not able to create a social contract among the population that would lead to a sense of 
national unity.2 The result was that the Haitian mission suffered from the same problems 
as Somalia and failed to make long-term improvements. 
I. A Historieal Baekground to Syte Failure iD Haiti 
Early History 
Originally discovered by Columbus in 1492 and founded as a Spanish colony on 
the eastern side of the island of Hispaniola, the current Dominican Republic, the French 
occupied the Western third in the late Seventeenth century, and converted what would 
become Haiti into a planter's paradise.3 By the time of the French Revolution, the colony 
was the richest in the Western Hemisphere.4 However, the Revolution sparked a 
movement to free the black slaves, which resulted in a revolt and eventual independence. 
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The Niaeteeatll Ceatary 
After winning independence from France in 1804, the population of Haiti is 
horribly divided: 
Slavery in Saint Domingue [Haiti's colonial name) had been particularly brutal, with 
commonplac:e whipping, mutilation, and torture, and the war for independenc:e was marked by 
atrocities on all sides. With the defeat and withdrawal of French lrOOps, tbe white French colonists 
either emigrated, in part to South Carolina and Louisiana, or were III8SS8CI'Cd by the newly 
independent Haitians. The colonial period and struggle for independence left Haiti with a confused 
legacy of racial pride and antagonism, plus a pmisting fear of white enroachment. The rigid 
colonial caste system, in which admixture of white blood determined social staiUS, persisted to the 
extent that Haitian mulattos continued to enjoy social and economic: advantages over blacks. 5 
The result is a country built around a segmented society, where the colour of a 
person's skin, as well as their education and wealth, still determined their place in the 
national hierarchy. Haiti's inhabitants have neither a common language (the wealthy 
speak French and the poor speak Creole) nor a shared religion (the poor practice Voodoo, 
while the rich are Christian). 6 Furthermore, there has never been a Haitian nation: "It 
began, instead, as a rebellion that begot an army. The army begot a national apparatus. 
That militarized apparatus, in turn begot the state. The nation trailed behind. Or, to pursue 
the metaphor to its bloody end, the state miscarried the nation."7 
Over time, Haiti's political culture became "characterised by the use of military 
force, the growing divisiveness among the population, troubled financial programs, and 
inefficient administration."8 Between 1845 and 1915, 21 people held the presidency, most 
serving for two tenns or less and only one completing his full tenn. 9 
Americaa lnterveatioa: 1915 
The U.S. decides to intervene in Haiti after a collapse of government authority and 
attacks on foreign legations requires a force to "occupy Port-au-Prince for the purpose of 
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protecting life and property and preserving order."10 In actuality, the intervention hopes 
both to protect American interests and to prevent European countries from establishing 
military bases that could challenge U.S. dominance in the Caribbean. 11 
The U.S. occupation is marked by three elements. The U.S. dismantles Haitian 
independent government by exerting control over the Haitian Congress and the 
President.12 Washington also exerts its control through the creation of the Gendarmerie 
d'Haiti, an American controlled native military force intended to be a "efficient, non-
partisan, centralised force sufficiently powerful to ensure continuity of pro-American 
political regimes and to eliminate the problem of instability caused by cyclical 
revolutions."13 The U.S. further resurrects an old French practice, of forcing peasants to 
perform labour on local roads in lieu of paying a road tax. The system, known as the 
"corvee", quickly resulted in widespread abuses.14 
Finally, the U.S. military forces engaged in systemic racism, which sees the 
unlawful execution of Haitians, 15 a belief among the U.S. administrators that fair 
elections and other republican institutions were impossible in Haiti, 16 and the imposition 
of Jim Crow- style racial segregation. 17 There is also a widespread fear in the U.S. 
government that withdrawing the troops would result in a victory by guerrilla forces and 
the discrediting of U.S. policy. Therefore, the intervention continues for almost two 
decades.11 
Nevertheless, there is a positive side to the occupation. The corvee, for all its 
brutality, did manage to build a substantial road system.19 For the first time, civil service 
reform occurs. 2° F onnal agriculture training is also offered, though Haitian subsistence 
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farmers who feel they am not risk their crops ignore it.21 The occupation also sees Haitian 
nationalism take its first few steps, particularly through the writings of Jean Price-Mars: 
Price-Mars sought to restore the self-confidence and pride of Haitians in themselves by helping 
them to malise that they were members of the human race who had developed a distinctive 
culture ... [He) hoped to inspire a national spirit that would weld intellectual elites and illiterate 
peasants together and enthuse Haitians as a group to resist oppression of any kind. 22 
The Changing Amerieaa Role: 1929-1956 
By 1929, the U.S. reconsiders its policies, and begins work to Haitianizie the 
government. Unfortunately, Price-Mars loses the Presidential race to Stenio Vincent, a 
mulatto, who becomes increasingly dictatorial as the U.S. occupation winds up23 and 
would later have himself declared dictator, decreeing that Haitians were too immature for 
democracy.24 
The nineteen-year American occupation of Haiti failed to focus on supporting 
long-tenn development in Haiti and on rebuilding its national capability. The only 
substantial change the occupation made was the professionalization of the Haitian Army, 
which during the 1940s emerged as the dominant force in Haitian politics and would 
continue in that role until the 1990s. 25 
In 1941, the U.S. pressures Vincent to step down. He is replaced by Elie Lescot, 
who "was not only corrupt but also obviously inept and increasingly insulting to black 
Haitians, who were systematically excluded from positions of power."26 This gave 
strength to the negritude movement, designed to place power in the hands of black 
Haitians. 
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Papa Doc and Baby Doc: 1957-1986 
After a series of incompetent regimes, the Negritude movement allows the 
election of Francois 'Papa Doc' Duvalier. Fearful both of the Haitian rich and of the 
army, he creates a cult of personality and a presidential guard, 'les Voluntaries de Ia 
Securite Nationale' (VSN).27 The U.S. supports him because he is perceived to be an anti-
Communist, and Haiti receives large amounts of investments and foreign aid from the 
U.S. government. The country becomes dependent on the aid.28 
In 1971, Jean-Claude 'Baby Doc' Duvalier succeeds his father. Through his 
'economic revolution,' he attempts to form an alliance of the Duvalier supporters with the 
traditional bourgeois and foreign capital, and dismisses the principles of negritude. The 
revolution fails and the economy lies in shambles. 29 Haitians complain about low wages 
and the repressive government, and the U.S. begins to experience a flood of Haitian 
refugees. There is also increasing evidence that the Haitian military and Jean-Claude 
Duvalier himself are profiting from the illegal trafficking of narcotics. 30 
Post-Duvalier Haiti: 1986-1991 
The United States begins actions in. 1985 to remove Duvalier from office, 
including cutting aid, further delaying other assistance, and counselling U.S. firms to 
leave Haiti. He flees in 1986.31 In 1987, the army assumes control with the partial support 
of the United States. While initially pro-democratic,32 the new President, Lieutenant 
General Henri Namphy begins to collude with Duvalierist forces and delays national 
elections. 33 When elections are held in January 1988, the preferred military candidate 
wins, but is then removed when he tries to take back control of import revenues from the 
army. Namphy reassumes the Presidency.34 
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Opposition to Namphy soon mounts, and he is removed by the military when he 
attempts to collude with Duvalierist supporters; including the VSN, to form a block which 
he would totally control. He is replaced by another general, who is then removed by a 
fourth military coup in early 1990.35 His successor, a fonner Supreme Court Justice, Ertha 
Pascal-Trouillot, is then forced to resign after widespread fiscal ineptness. 
This mobilises the remaining Haitian elites -quiet until now-, who warn that 
interference in the next elections would not be tolerated. They then ask both the UN and 
the Organization of American States (OAS) to monitor the election, which is held with 
the country in a state of near-anarchy and with a bankrupt government. The winner is a 
Catholic priest, Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who is supported heavily by the poor and 
disenfranchised.36 Aristide wins a landslide victory- receiving 67.48% of the vote- which 
in tum establishes a mandate to transform the old regime, which still dominates the 
government and military, into an equal and democratic Haiti.37 
D. The Collapse of the State 
Haiti, throughout its history, had never truly been a truly functioning state. It 
always suffered from great weakness. But by the time of the 1990 election, the 
government was bankrupt. By Zartman's criteria,38 Haiti had already hit all the signposts 
of failure. As aid monies dried up, the government not only ceased to make difficult 
choices, but to function altogether. But, most importantly, power in the country was not 
centred in the government, but rather in the Army, the remaining Duvalierist elements, 
and in the elites. Therefore, the government did not have true control over its own 
policies or agents. Haiti was already a failed state, but in the next four years this failure 
would increase in scope into a complex emergency. 
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Aristide's Govenmeat and the Co•p 
Aristide's government would last only seven months before the military launched 
another coup. The reasons for the coup are hotly debated. It is suggested that the new 
President simply lacked the political manipulative talents necessary for the job and failed 
to understand the role of compromise. 39 Similarly, his attempts to reform both the military 
and the economic basis of Haiti alienated most of the country's elites in an effort to bring 
on side the country's bourgeoisie.40 Aristide established a minimum wage, instituted a 
war against both corruption and drugs, attempted to reform the civil service, started a 
literacy campaign but also often advocated class warfare.41 
Because of this, he faced problems from three core groups. One was the army, still 
dominated by pro-Duvalier elements, and very fearful that Aristide might abolish the 
army altogether. Opposition also came from a variety of social organisations, ranging 
from other pro-Duvalier groups, to disgruntled members of Aristide's own coalition, 
upset both with his rapprochement to the U.S., IMF, and World Bank and his failure to 
give them government jobs. Finally, the business community feared that his policies 
might negatively affect both the economy and their own lifestyles. 42 
Aristide also began to act undemocrati~ally, pressuring opposition parties to vote 
in favour of his legislation , even threatening them with the Pere LeBrun, necklacing with 
burning tires. On 21 September 1991, he made a speech before the UN General Assembly 
laced with populist rhetoric, and then returned to Haiti where, in a public speech, he 
stated "if you see a faker who pretends to be one of our supporters ... just grab him. Make 
sure be gets what he deserves. ""3 
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Unsurprisingly, a coup occurred on 29 September 1991.44 The commander of the 
military, General Raoul Cedras, who was personally appointed by Aristide, assumed the 
presidency and allowed Aristide to flee to the United States. Cedras immediately took to 
the airwaves to state that "after seven months of democratic experience, the country once 
again finds itself a prey to the horrors of uncertainty. With all Haitians, we will bring the 
ship to port. "45 
m. The UN Interventioa 
A. Iaitial Steps: Preventive Action and Peacemaking 
The international community moved quickly after the coup. On 2 October 1991, 
Aristide met with the OAS ministers for foreign affairs, and on 3 October, they adopted a 
resolution demanding his immediate reinstatement. The next day, an OAS delegation 
arrived in Haiti and met with representatives of civilian groups and the military, but was 
forced to leave on 7 October. 
Meanwhile, also on 3 October, Aristide addressed the UN Security Council, who 
condemned the coup and on 11 October, the General Assembly passed a resolution which 
condemned the illegal replacement of the constitutionally elected president and ordered 
the immediate restoration of the government 46 
However, an impasse quickly developed, with the Anny refusing to surrender 
control of the government 47 It also became apparent that within Haiti there was a pattern 
of gross and widespread human rights abuses, and this coupled with a deteriorating 
political and economic situation meant thousands of Haitians started to flee the country. 
The UN and the OAS sent a joint high level mission on 15 July 1992, which did 
not make any progress toward negotiating a political solution. The UN then sent a special 
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envoy, Dante Caputo, who succeeded in negotiating a mandate for an international 
civilian mission in Haiti (MICIVIH). MICIVIH would verify respect for human rights, 
including the rights to life, the integrity and security of person, personal liberty, freedom 
of expression and of association. It was deployed on S March 1993.41 The UN also took 
action to force the Army to abdicate power. On 23 June the UN imposed a full oil and 
arms embargo, which included a freeze on all international funds.49 
By the end of June 1993, both sides appeared to be interested in reaching a 
compromise. General Cedras informed the special envoy that he wished to initiate a 
dialogue with President Aristide in order to end the crisis. so At the same time, the 
international community, particularly the U.S., was interested in a compromise as well, 
due primarily to large scale refugee problems, which U.S. agencies now saw as a threat to 
US · nat• Sl . . natio mterests. 
B. Second Step: Traditional Peacekeepiag 
After a week of negotiations in New York, the Governor's Island agreement was 
signed. It included provisions for Aristide's return to Haiti, Cedras's early retirement, a 
return to democracy as quickly as possible, and for the deployment of a traditional 
peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). The mission would 
modernise the armed forces, create a new national police force, and aid MICIVIH. In 
exchange, sanctions would be immediately suspended. 52 
The agreement was a complete failure. 53 While the UN advanced team was 
deployed by plane, the bulk of the force composed of 200 U.S. and 25 Canadian soldiers 
and civilians was sent on the Harlan County, a U.S. ship, on 11 October. The ship was 
prevented from landing in Port-au-Prince by an armed mob. Under the threat of violence 
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the other components of the mission -the UN police monitors and MICIVa also retreated 
from Haiti. 54 
Prospects for the mission had never been auspicious. Violence and demonstrations 
continued throughout Haiti, but the peacekeeping forces had assumed that theirs would be 
a traditional role, and were lightly anned.55 Furthermore, the U.S. had just seen the 
venture into Somalia dissolve into disaster, which resulted in an unwillingness to put U.S. 
troops in danger: '"Crossing the Mogadishu line' and the disasters that lay therein now 
became a fixation in Washington ... U.S. peacekeepers must never again become party to 
a conflict' their protection must be the overriding priority of U.S. policy."56 The Haitians 
also linked these peacekeeping forces with the scenes of violence from Somalia. 51 Finally, 
it has been alleged that U.S. personnel informed Cedras that the UN forces could be 
easily thwarted, encouraging him to call their bluff. 51 
The result was that the UN, and particularly the Clinton administration, retreated 
from the crisis, and the ruling junta was showri that the international community was not 
prepared to follow tough talk with action. 59 The failure produced two major effects: the 
UN imposed even more stringent sanctions and the junta continued its human rights 
violations. 60 
1. Sanctions 
The role of sanctions as a tool has often been questioned. Particularly when these 
are not targeted in ways to harm the ruling hierarchy, they can end up hurting the 
population of a country. In Haiti, the sanctions had notably direct effects, none being 
what the UN intended. The sanctions actually ended up disproportionately hurting the 
poorest, who saw both employment fall and prices, including food, rise. The result was 
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that during La Crise, as it is known in Haiti, per capita income fell by 30 percent, while 
inflation rose by 138 percent.61 
Further, the Army actually benefited from the sanctions. Since the military 
hierarchy effectively controlled the Haitian economy, it was in the position to make 
windfall profits from the black market, while at the same time they used threats of 
violence to extort money from the population.62 Furthermore, the military also 
appropriated an increasingly large share of the country's wealth, and received forty 
percent of the country's budget.63 
Thirdly, the General Assembly resolution calling for sanctions stated: 
That there were to be no relations with the de facto government. This resolution was interpreted by 
the international agencies still operating in Haiti to mean that no resoun:es, including humanitarian 
(aid) could be channelled through the public sector at any administrative level, including the level 
of the community health centre and school.tt64 
Thus, there was no distinction made between the government, the state, and various state 
agencies. This meant that not only did the apparatus of the state effectively atrophy, but 
that aid agencies in Haiti were often forced to assume the role the state had previously 
held to ensure delivery of food and basic medical services. 65 
The result of the sanctions was that the state apparatus fell apart, " ... weakening 
one of the key institutions required for Haiti to make a successful transition to 
democracy.'t66 And because of the economic collapse they created, the sanctions actually 
reduced the capacity for political mobilisatiGn.67 It was only through the actions of 
international aid agencies that famine was avoided, epidemics contained, and social 
services in the country preserved.68 In fact, it has been argued that "ironically, the most 
important humanitarian impact of the Chapter VII military intervention may well have 
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been the end of the coercive economic sanctions ... that bad devastated the local economy 
and the Haitian poor."69 
2. Violence 
The second change was further repression and greater violence within Haiti. As 
early as 1992, violence had substantially increased when Colonel Michel Francois, the 
head of Haiti's police, broke with Cedras.70 His officers, particularly in rural 
communities, targeted directly any peasants who favoured Aristide and either intimidated 
or killed them. 71 The military also saw all forms of independent association to be 
potential sources of popular unrest, thus a potential challenge to their rule. Therefore, the 
army decided to return the country to ''the atomised and fearful society of the Duvalier-
era so that even if international pressure secure[d] the return of President Aristide, he 
would have difficulty transforming his personal popularity into organised support needed 
to exert civilian authority over a violent and recalcitrant army."72 
The Anny targeted large numbers of groups, including the media -ten radio 
stations were shut down on the first day of the coup and at least five journalists killed, 
pro-Aristide elected officials, rural development and peasant organisations, 
neighbourhood and community associations, trade unions, literacy groups, pro-democracy 
groups, students' groups, and womens' groups. All public signs of dissatisfaction with the 
junta were swiftly repressed, meetings of any kind, including chance encounters, were 
banned, and even the groups not threatened directly with violence were often extorted by 
the military. 73 
Thus, as the UN sat in limbo, unable to muster the forces necessary to push for a 
more forceful intervention into Haiti, the country itself was facing myriad problems. The 
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government, which had always relied on aid, bad ceased to function in any meaningful 
way and the military swiftly repressed any challenges to their authority. Violence and 
corruption were endemic. Haiti did not collapse into a humanitarian emergency only 
because NGOs were already there to support the necessary functions of life. But the 
Haitian state itself, by 1994, had ail but collapsed. 
C. nird Step: Peace Enforeement 
In light of the problems crippling Haiti, and coupled with massive numbers of 
new refugees washing up on U.S. shores, the United States began preparing for a 
multinational military intervention: The junta's ·~year history of intransigence and 
duplicity indicated that a credible threat of force would be necessary to remove the 
illegitimate regime. "74 On July 31 1994, the Security Council adopted resolution 940: 
By the tenns of the resolution, the Council ... authorised Member Swes to fonn a multinational 
force under unified command and control and 'to usc all necessary means' to facilitate the 
depanure of the military leadership, the prompt return of the legitimately elec:ted President and the 
restoration of the legitimate government authorities.''75 
Thus, the UN was once again approving a peace enforcement mission that would be run 
under Chapter VTI of the Charter.16 
The U.S. would provide the bulk of the initial forces, with President Clinton 
arguing that: 
(T]he fundamenlal interests of the U.S. justified an attack if it was the only method to restore 
democracy in Haiti. If the U.S. did not lead this effort, the nation faced both the continuation of 
gross human rights violations in a neighbouring island and the continued refugee problems 
bringing more Haitians who fled whether for political or economic reasons."77 
The U.S. military had long prepared for a possible intervention, and a plan began 
to come together in the fall of 1993. Involved in this exercise senior officers from all four 
branches of the military, many of whom had had experience either in Haiti or in other 
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U.S. operations in the Caribbean.71 By May 1994 the planners had created two possible 
scenarios. The first assumed an invasion, and was classified as secret, which meant that 
few people outside of the military knew of its existence. The second plan, however, 
assumed a permissive entry into Haiti and became more of a humanitarian support plan. It 
had a lower classified status, which meant the military could co-ordinate the plan with 
other U.S. aid organisations that would be invoived. 79 
By September 1994, President Clinton· publicly stated that all diplomatic efforts 
had been exhausted and force might have to be used, adding that more than 20 countries 
had agreed to be part of the initial force.80 On 17 September, with U.S. forces already on 
route to Haiti, a last diplomatic mission, consisting of ex-President Jimmy Carter, retired 
general Colin Powell and Senator Sam Nunn, head of the Senate Anned Services 
Committee managed to get the Haitian government to sign a peace agreement which 
allowed for the permissive entry of the U.S.-led force.81 
1. Uphold Democracy 
The U.S. invasion of Haiti, while not met by violence, still worked to secure the 
environment quickly, seizing first the airport and seaport in Port-au-Prince, connecting 
them, and then establishing a base on Cap Haitien. From there the mission expanded to all 
parts of Haiti. Rapid reaction forces were available at all times, with air, helicopter, and 
rapid deployment troops poised on the aircraft carrier USS America. 
The U.S. mission, known as the Multinational Force (MNF) and the follow-on UN 
mission, UNMIH, both had the same long term strategy. MNF' s job was to create a 
secure environment and then pave the way for UNMlll, which would then redevelop the 
country.82 The U.S. mission had five main goals: To maintain security and stability in the 
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country; To return Haiti to constitutional rule and reinstate President Aristide; To create a 
. 
new, legitimate national police force; To hold both national and local elections; And 
finally, to work to restore basic services and infrastructure.13 
2. UNMIH: The Humanitarian Mission 
UNMIH would focus on humanitarian needs, the restoration of government, and 
economic recovery. In order to alleviate the humanitarian crisis, the intervention provided 
food, health services, and short-term jobs. The U.S. government and other agencies 
provided a million individuals with one meal a day, and NGOs would provide health 
services to 2 million.14 In order to create a long-term secure environment, the mission 
focused on rebuilding the Haitian National Police (HNP). In order to restore the 
government, the mission also organised local and parliamentary elections, worked to 
rebuild government ministries that were literally gutted during the military occupation, 
and finally worked to strengthen local government and the community in order to avoid 
the corruption that was endemic within the central government. 85 
In the long term, the mission hoped to reconceptualize the role of the state and its 
relationships with all levels of government and NGOs, which might well include 
contracting out services to NGOs while maintaining oversight, regulatory and planning 
control. 86 It would also be necessary to overhaul the education system, which suffered 
from low participation, poor access in rural areas and poor instructional quality.87 Finally, 
the public health system was to be improved, as Haitians continued to suffer from poor 
sanitation, inadequate nutrition, and unequal ~ccess to health care.88Since the mission's 
main goals focused around the creation of the HNP and holding elections, the mission 
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started to be drawn down in early 1996. However, it remained active to support Rene 
Preval's newly elected government in its attempts at institutional refonn.89 
D. Fourth Step: A Return to Tnditioaal Peacekeeping 
UNMlli was then replaced by three successive missions that operated under 
traditional peacekeeping guidelines. The first, the UN Support Mission in Haiti, was to 
"assist the Government of Haiti in the professionalization of the police and in the 
maintenance of a secure and stable environment conducive to the success of the current 
efforts to establish and train an effective national police force.''90 The next mission, the 
UN Transition Mission in Haiti, was to assist the government "by supporting and 
contributing to the professionalization of the Haitian National Police."91 These missions 
were mounted because, during UNMHI, the UN realised that: ''the creation of an 
effective, non-pOlitical police force is the work of years, not months. "92 
But these missions still focused on a force that was highly centralised -much like 
the force created in the earlier U.S. intervention: "In Haiti particularly, the potential for 
the misuse of a centralised force, no matter how well trained or how neutral, would 
remain high. "93 They also ignored the earlier focus on community-based development. 94 
The final UN mission in Haiti, the UN Civilian Support Mission in Haiti 
(MICAH), was created in an attempt to solve this contradiction. While it would focus on 
the continued professionalization of the police, it was also tasked with "further promoting 
human rights and reinforcing the institutional effectiveness of the Haitian police and 
judiciary .. .''95 
To a degree MICAH was successful. But it also repeated the mistakes of the 
previous missions, and its final report found that "institutional, social and economic 
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development must [still] be addressed in an ~tegrated manner in order to consolidate 
democracy and peace. "96 
In the end, the UN ended MICAH by determining that the government of Haiti 
ultimately beared the responsibility to reform its institutions, provide security for the 
population and to reform the electoral process, 97 thereby abrogating the UN' s own 
responsibility. 
IV. Lessoas Learned 
A. Successes 
The UN missions did have some notable successes, and certainly were not the 
same abject failure as Somalia The UN succeeded in three areas: policy, by initially 
moving quickly to deal with matters; mandate; which was clear, allowed some lee-way, 
and allowed for a clean handover; and operationally, through clearer co-ordination 
between all parties. 
1. Policy 
The UN moved quickly to deal with matters. President Aristide was restored to 
power on IS October 1994, less than a month after the MNF arrived. 98 Furthermore, the 
UNMIH advance team arrived in Haiti on 18 October, which allowed the two groups to 
quickly establish good co-operative relations. The first international police monitors 
arrived on 24 October, even while the U.S. military was still drawing down its invasion 
forces to its long tenn MNF commitment of 15,000.99 
2. Mandate 
The mandate was clear, which facilitated both effective planning and resource 
allocation. Furthennore, while the Security Council provided clear support, it was hands 
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off with limited interference. And while there was some mission creep, the tasks were 
considered to be both vital to the success of the mission and to re-establish the roots of 
the government. 100 The result was that when problems emerged, the mandate was flexible 
enough to deal with them. 
Humanitarian aid was also quickly re-established, and when aid convoys and 
warehouses were targeted by gangs, UNMIH· quickly expanded its mandate to protect 
them by carrying out patrols, escorting convoys and providing back-up for Haitian 
authorities in law and order situations. UNMIH also assumed a large civil affairs role, 
engaging in projects to improve the Haitian power supply, transporting repatriated 
refugees and aiding both the national and municipal governments. 101 
Finally, the transfer to UNMIH was seamless. The long lead time that the 
advanced team had in the country meant that when the MNF stated on 1 S January 1995 
that a secure and stable environment now existed, the transition consisted of the troops 
switching from wearing kevlar helmets to blue berets. Since the MNF had fielded 
upwards of 20,000 troops at its maximum, and UNMIH would only have 6,000, the 
decision was made early on to reduce the MNF size to 6,000 in order to show the Haitian 
population that the force was still large enough. 102 
3.0perational 
The long term planning paid off. Not only did the several missions have the 
advantage of using the lessons learned from previous U.S. operations, including Somalia 
and other actions in the Caribbean, they also enjoyed the advantage of a permissive entry, 
and had a great deal of flexibility built into their operations. This meant that U.S. forces 
quickly adapted on the groWld, including changing their Rules of Engagement when 
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Haitian military forces were seen attacking and killing civilians. Furthermore, the MNF 
was combined with both an appropriate UN force and with the international police forces, 
allowing for a more robust set of options to deal with any problems or crises. 103 
The MNF and UN forces also had the co-operation of the government of President 
Aristide. Equally importantly they understood that the political legitimacy of the mission 
lay in quickly holding elections, which they did in December 1995.104 
Many UN organisations and NGOs were also already involved in the country, and 
knew what help was needed. Thus, when MICIVIH returned to Haiti on 22 October 1994 
not only did it already have experience monitoring human rights in the country, and thus 
could quickly resume its mandate, but it was also able to contribute to rebuilding Haitian 
institutions.105 Finally, the Special Represeniative of the Secretary-General, Lakhdar 
Brahimi, met regularly with President Ari~de and was able to closely co-ordinate 
problem areas. 106 
B. Failures 
The missions also featured five substantial failures in the areas of policy, 
operation, and the role of the military: 1) short-term bias that ignored proper institutional 
reconstruction except in the case of the police. 2) overarching co-ordination problems; 3) 
difficulty rebuilding the police; 4) the role of the military was not clear; S) little proper 
institutional rebuilding. 
1. Policy 
a Short Term Bias 
The missions constantly worked under the assumptions that a democratic 
government would be able rebuild the institutions of the country after they left. Therefore, 
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they were unwilling to engage in any projects which necessitated long tenn involvement 
in the country. Any attempts at true nation-building had been irrevocably damaged by the 
problems in Somalia, and therefore the intervening forces set the bar low. Ambassador 
William Swing argued that ''we achieved the objectives we aimed for .. . so from our point 
of view it has been a success."107 This attitude focused prominendy in both the failure to 
rebuild the police force, and in the failure to create an accountable democratic structure. 
b. Institutional Reconstruction 
The police force was the only state institution on which the UN mission focused. 
Even this failed because the judiciary was not refonned and was viewed as corrupt and 
held in low esteem: "Although the new police force enjoys substantial legitimacy, the 
judicial system does not. This disjuncture threatens to undermine the entire criminal 
justice system."108 President Rene Preval, who succeeded Aristide, described the Haitian 
justice system as 'putrid.' 109 The Haitian elites themselves preferred a pliable justice 
system, and therefore were not interested in an independent judiciary, while the few 
NGOs assigned to the task performed badly as. "project managers had either no relevant 
technical skills or lacked appropriate country experience. " 110 
This lack of institution building also fundamentally threatened Haiti's democratic 
system. U.S. commentators suggested that Aristide was not a democrat, but that rather, 
during his first term of office, he: 
did not distinguish himself as a democrat, pea<:emaker, or friend of the United States. Instead he 
railed against the United States and the Catholic Church. urged his followers to physically destroy 
their {and his) political enemies, reportedly worked to create his own paramilitary goon squad, and 
did little to advance the cause of capitalist democracy .. . 111 
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A second problem arose, because the 1995 election, which Aristide's handpicked 
successor, Rene Preval, won by a landslide had only a 30% participation rate. Many 
Haitians did not vote because they believed· that Preval would automatically win. 112 
Preval's government went on to intertwine party and government business 113 and failed to 
make substantial refonns: "Enjoying less popularity than his predecessor, Preval's limited 
public support impeded his ability to move forward with unpopular refonns."114 By 1997, 
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Enrique Ter Horst, stated that in 
Haiti, ·~democracy has not been able to deliver the goods-and that is dangerous ... There 
isn't even a functioning state right now."m The problems continued even into the 2000 
election, which was filled with delays, logisti~ difficulties, and violence that was often 
caused by supporters of Aristide.116 U.S. Congressman Porter Goss went as far as to 
directly implicate Aristide in the problems: "There has been calculated violence meant to 
disrupt the democratic process. It has been alleged that former president Aristide is 
responsible, in part, for this."117 
2. Operatioaal 
a. Overarching Co-ordination 
The overarching co-ordination of the two missions was cumbersome and often 
difficult to work in. This can be partially explained by the organisational and cultural 
differences of civilian and military organisations,118 and by the simple fact that by 
December 1994 there were over 400 NGOs of all sizes and descriptions providing 
humanitarian assistance. 119 However there were also widespread systemic problems. 
As in Somalia, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, nominally in 
charge of the operation, had little authority over the various UN agencies. He also lacked 
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any staff mechanism to co-ordinate directly or indirectly the activities of the military and 
NGOs. 120 Haiti demonstrated that the personal qualities of the SRSG can be 
fundamentally important. For example, Lakhdar Brabimi was remembered even two years 
after his departure from the post for both his activism and for being a 'true friend of 
Haiti'.121 
Further, there had been no attempts to fully integrate operational-level interagency 
co-ordination in the planning and preparation stages, with no civilian-military co-
ordination for the first thirty days. 122 Not only was the military surprised that their civilian 
counterparts were not immediately ready with nation-building plans, but they also 
expected NGOs to immediately receive money once the embargo was lifted and U.S. 
forces were on the ground, something that just did not occur. As in Somalia, the military 
did establish Civil Military Operations Centres and the non-military and more benign 
looking Humanitarian Assistance Co-ordination Centres, which, in conjunction with 
US AID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, worked to co-ordinate activities between 
the two groups.123 However, they had no overt ·authority even within the US military, and 
instead were forced to rely on persuasion for their influence. 124 
Finally, as with most peacekeeping missions, there was a fundamental difference 
in the style of peacekeeping of the various forces. The peacekeepers, particularly the 
Pakistanis and U.S. civil affairs teams, who made an effort to assist communities with 
projects that addressed local needs ensured a repository of goodwill which resulted in a 
more secure peacekeeping environment. This occurred even though such projects were 
not recognised explicitly in the mandate, and only occurred at the discretion of senior 
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officers who "creatively interpreted their general mandate to ensure local security and the 
security of their troops as including better community relations." 125 
b. The Police 
Another source of considerable problems was the newly created Haitian National 
Police. When the handover to the UN occurred, 5,000 police were deployed who bad only 
4 months experience, and whose neutrality was suspect. As reports of police crimes 
increased, including police beating or killing victims, 126 questions were raised about both 
the force's leadership and training. MICIVIH argued in support of the force, saying 
"although police officers frequently used excessive force, they were not systematically 
repressing the population for political or other reasons."127 The force itself also faced a 
deliberate pauem of intimidation and of assassination which did not simplify the 
situation.128 Therefore, there was a realisation that long-term security could only be 
provided by a force accountable to the rule of l~w. 
3. The Military 
The military's role in Haiti proved troublesome. There was a great deal of initial 
confusion simply because the military had in fact had so long to plan. In the eleven 
months prior to the operation, policy changed dramatically. This resulted in different 
groups planning different missions, working with different parameters, and arguing 
different long-term strategies. While it was eventually all combined, the sheer scope of 
planning both led to unnecessary delays and the involvement of too many people for real 
candour and easy adaptation of the plans when problems were noticed. 129 
The military also handled disarmament poorly. While the missions did focus more 
on this issue than the Somalia mission did, it was seen as "just something 'everybody 
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knew' was probably impossible and almost certainly counterproductive. "130 The missions 
confiscated all visible weapons and took control of the stocks of Haitian military 
weapons. 131 They also engaged in voluntary programs, including a weapons amnesty and 
a weapons buy-back program.132 The actual success of the program, however, was limited 
with even its proponents arguing that it was marginally successful in disarming those who 
directly threatened the national peace, 133 In total, all disarmament operations in Haiti 
netted 30,000 of the estimated 175,000 small arms that were in circulation.134 
Finally the ROEs for the military forces were ambiguous. While they were 
consistent among all the forces, their interpretation was not. Thus the U.S. Army forces in 
Port-au-Prince were instructed not to become involved in law and order problems, and 
watched as military troops fought and killed civilians. A change in posture occurred 
rapidly after this, but mission participants later noted that "no change in the ROE itself 
occurred, but a new interpretation of the original ROE emerged from the ... events."135 
V. Conclusions 
In the en~ the Haitian mission failed not from the problems of mission creep, but 
rather due to a limited mandate and limited commitment. The mission was hamstrung by 
the need for a clear exit policy: 
... The international community had applied to Haiti a methodology for peace support operations 
that had been developed elsewhere. This methodology was char"Kterized by benchmarks by which 
international officials could claim to have reStored a country to good health. All international 
interventions were seen as needing an "exit policy" and benchmarks for the implementation of this 
policy. On the political front, these benchmarks were usually elections, and an elected government 
that could be recognized as legitimate... Expensive elections and other democracy-building 
exercises were, therefore, conducted in several conflicted societies not on the basis of any local 
rationale, but in order to "exit" quickly.136 
Because of this need, the mission failed to concentrate on institution building. 
Quick fixes could not solve a long history of problems. What was needed in Haiti was 
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social engineering to change fundamentally the relationship between the state and civil 
society.137 But the mission did not focus on this. A U.S. diplomat referred to it rather as a 
model "only for the national war college: exit strategy as diplomacy."131 
Had the new democratic system in Haiti worked then the state may well have been 
able to rebuild, or at least renew, its own institutions, particularly with the degree of 
international aid it was receiving. But basing an entire operation around this assumption, 
which is essentially what the Haitian mission did, does not properly identify the long-tenn 
problems in a failed state. Haiti bad failed, or never started, for a reason. At its simplest 
level, it can be argued that Haiti never generated a sense of nationhood, and that the few 
attempts to do so, particularly with Jean-Price Mars at the end of the prior U.S. 
occupation, had failed as the government once again became oppressive and saw the 
Haitian civil society as a threat. 
As in Somalia, in the short tenn the mission was a success. A growing complex 
emergency was stopped through intemationaJ efforts, and a secure environment was 
created. But in the long tenn, nothing changed: 
Other than halting the mass exodus of Haitians to the U.S., the long-term effects of intervention 
are negligible as of April 1999. The underlying conditions that caused the original problems 
remain: i.e. political instability; civil unrest; and economic collapse. Political instability is growing 
due to the inability to peacefully transfer political power after President Aristide's tenn. Civil 
unrest has grown to the point that General Charles Wilhelm, Commander in Chief, Southern 
Command, had called for the withdrawal of all U.S. fon:es from Haiti on the grounds that they are 
devoting more time to self protection than any mission. 139 
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Chapter V: Conclusions- The Need for a New Humanitarian Intervention Framework 
Have the lessons learned in Somalia an~ Haiti, coupled with the research done by 
the UN and other actors, actually enabled the UN to launch a successful humanitarian 
intervention? Unfortunately, the UN intervention in Siena Leone, a state that suffered a 
long-term civil war and saw the failure of basic government services, a classic failed 
state, shows that the lessons are still not being applied. 
1: Continuing Failures- The Case of Sierra Leone 
Siena Leone had been locked in a three-way civil war since 1991 between the 
government, the anny, and a rebel force, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). In 1997, 
the UN imposed an oil and anns embargo and authorised a military observer group 
(ECOMOG) from the Economic Community of West African States. In 1998, ECOMOG, 
responding to an attack by the rebel and army forces, launched an overt military operation 
that led to the collapse of the forces in Freetown, the capital, and paved the way for 
negotiations that led to a peace agreement in July of 1999.1 
The UN mission in Siena Leone (UNAMSIL) was deployed in October 1999 
under a traditional peacekeeping mandate to co-operate with the government of Siena 
Leone to implement the peace agreement; to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate the 
combatants; and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. With the withdrawal 
of ECOMOG, the mission was expanded under Chapter VII for fear that Sierra Leone 
might destablize the region. The new mandate called for UNAMSIL to provide also 
security at key locations and government buildings; insure the free flow of people, goods, 
and humanitarian assistance; to co-ordinate and assist the government in reconstituting 
the police and army; and to guard weapons depots. 2 
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The mission, however, had problems from the start implementing these goals. To 
begin with, "progress in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme 
has generally been very slow ... [which] is compounded by continuing unrest among ex-
combatants in disarmament...camps".4 As well, peacekeepers found themselves under 
attack from RUF forces timed to coincide with the ECOMOG pull out in early May, with 
the situation stabilising only after the United Kingdom deployed troops and established a 
naval presence, which restored the confidence of the peacekeepers and Sierra Leoneans. 5 
Finally, the focus of the mission was not on rebuilding the core institutions of 
government, but rather that "the restructuring and training of the Sierra Leonean armed 
forces ... as well as the training of the police, will require important support from the 
international community. "6 
These problems resulted m the stze of the nnsswn swelling from 4,000 
peacekeepers under the original mandate to an authorised strength of 13,000 by May 
Orchard 119 
2000.7 Furthermore, with this npid change in mandates, a Security Council Commission 
found that "some of the key actors continue to work in unbannonized and, in certain 
cases, competing directions. Among the GoveJ;DIDent, ECOW AS and UNAMSIL, and in 
each of them, we foWld different perceptions of the reality on the ground, and of policy 
objectives and the strategy and means necessary to meet them. "8 
The Commission determined that the mission- over a year after it was deployed· 
still lacks a comprehensive strategy with clear objectives and that the establishment of an 
UN-based mec~sm for overall co-ordination is all-important.9 However, even with 
these changes, the mission will face long term problems. The UN, while accepting that 
"... after more than eight years of brutal conflict, building trust and confidence will take 
time and will require a concerted effort by all parties ... as well as the international 
community,'' refuses to take long tenn responsibility for the mission, stating that "the 
responsibility for the success of the peace process ultimately lies with people and leaders 
of Sierra Leone." 10 
Therefore, in Sierra Leone today the situation is similar to that of Somalia in 
1992-1993. The mission has been expanded without adequate examination of the actual 
requirements for a successful deployment, neither is there any long tenn nation·building 
occurring. While the UN has focused on disarmament ·a process implemented very 
slowly and thereby creating its own problems·, it has failed to focus on institutional 
reconstruction apart from the military and police, thereby failing to create a government 
and leaders that will be perceived as legitimate and accountable. 
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D. A New Bum•nitarian Intervention Fnmework 
Is it possible to launch a successful humanitarian intervention? To return to an 
earlier observation, what we have seen in the 1990's does not in itself place in question 
the merit of such missions, but rather the actual record of the operations themselves. 
When the U.S. and the UN became involved in Somalia, it was for the right 
reasons. However, their view of the situation was skewed, both by the end of the Cold 
War and the success of the Gulf War, and by a lack of understanding of what constituted 
a failed state. In Somalia, the decision to not fully disarm the combatants, to abandon 
impartiality by adopting Security Council Resolution 837, and not to engage in long term 
societal reconstruction, effectively ended any chance of success the mission had. In Haiti, 
the intervention forces demonstrated a far greater understanding of what they were 
entering, however the failure of Somalia had effectively already poisoned this mission, as 
well. Once again, no long-term reconstruction was attempted -except in the case of the 
Haitian police. 
Similarly, both missions demonstrated how hard it was to intervene in a failed 
state. In hindsight, in both cases, it was agreed that had the intervention occurred earlier, 
it would have both been more effective and far cheaper. Therefore, any proposed 
framework must be based around the type of intervention that is necessary. Once a failed 
or failing state is recognised, and depending on how bad the domestic environment of the 
state is, there are three phases of intervention the international community may choose: 
Pre-failure Intervention; Limited Intervention; and Humanitarian Intervention. Once an 
intervention has begun, the fourth phase, Long-term Development should then be 
followed. 
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Table V-1: A New Humanitarian IDterveatioa Fnmework 
State Failure 
Phase 1: Pre-Failure laterveation • I 
• Preveatative Ac:tioa 
I I Envoy Diplomacy I Diplomacy ,_. ,.---· =~·I Peacemaking I I I I I I I I Interveatioa I I I I 
I 
I 
Phase ll: Limited Intervention 
I 
I 
I ~ , I 
I 
I I Limited Assistance r-------1 Civillaterveatioas I I I / I I Military Interveatioa Peacekeeping t-------
I ( Chapter VI) I 
- .. I -  I 
I 
Phase ill: Humanitarian Interveation 
I + I Clear Mandate I I I Adequate Forces I 
I Peace Enforcement I .. Reconstruction l------- (Chapter VB) .... Clear Handover 
Impartiality 
Phase IV: Long Term Dev.elopment ..... 
""''I I 
Table V -Z: Espansion of Phase IV 
Phase IV: Long Term Development I 
Tier 1: Secure Environment 
~ r 
Tier 2: Disarmament, Demobilisatioa, 
Reintegration 
,, 
Tier 3: Rebuilding 
Core Institutions 
Tier 4: Long Term Reconstruction of 
Civil Society 
Creation of a Politically Stable 
Country 
A. Phase 1: Pre-Failure Iaterveatioo 
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May occur 
at same 
time 
The first phase revolves around the need to intervene as early as possible in a 
failed or failing state. Waiting until the situation has completely degraded produces 
increasingly complicated peacebuilding efforts. In the case of Somalia, for example, 
Mohamed Shanoun pinpointed three times when the UN could have intervened earlier 
with significantly less expenditure of money and life. 
Orchard 123 
1. Preventive Action 
The first theme is preventive action, whereby the UN makes efforts to prevent the 
state from failing. While the UN has only recently proposed this, it would see the 
organisation work to "develop diagnostic, analytical, planning and training instruments 
that will help African governments and their civil society partners to formulate proactive 
politics and strategies for managing disputes and diversity in their societies in pre-
emptive, constructive, non-violent ways. " 11 
The UN would focus both on building governmental and NGO capacities to 
further national development, while supporting institutions and mechanisms geared to 
manage and regulate disputes before they escalate into violence. 12 
The UN would build preventive action around three major steps. The ~ early 
warning analysis, would start by analysing the key causes of conflict in a country, 
prioritise sectors for responses, and define specific objectives. The second step would be 
geared around identifying the range of potential preventive measures for each objective, 
determining the proper combination of measures, and assessing where the UN or NGOs 
have the advantage and should be used. Th~ third step would be preventive action, 
starting by integrating the participation of UN departments and agencies and clearly 
identifying lead agencies for each measure, then consulting with all lead departments to 
determine objectives and measures, and finally identifying operational requirements 
including mandates. The UN would then co-ordinate operational implementation of each 
preventive measure and partner with local actors, such as the host government, regional 
organisations and NGOs. The UN would also monitor the action, evaluate the success of 
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each measure and assess any negative outcomes and finally determine the criteria for 
success and the clean withdrawal of assistance. 13 
2. Diplomacy 
The other theme in early intervention is the use of diplomacy. Intervening in a 
state without the consent of all parties and a peace agreement is considerably more 
complicated than intervening in a peaceful society. Therefore, the earlier the international 
community can create a workable peace agreement, the easier long-term reconstruction 
becomes. The UN generally uses two types of diplomacy. 
a. Envoy Diplomacy 
The first type is to use diplomacy in an effort to have the parties negotiate their 
differences and produce a workable peace agreement. This can be accomplished within 
the country itself, using neighbouring countries or other neutral countries, using regional 
organizations, or using the good offices of the Secretary-General. It is vital that 
diplomacy does not deal solely with military leaders, but also with the traditional leaders 
of the country- including, elders, intellectuals, business owners, religious leaders and the 
political opposition- as well as dealing with local levels of government and its 
representatives. 
b. Peacemaking 
The second type of diplomacy is the use of peacemaking. The negotiating body 
continues to negotiate in good faith, however it is made clear to the belligerents that if an 
agreement is not reached, then UN or other forces will be deployed to bring peace without 
the consent of all parties. Thus it is the use of a threat of a military intervention to prevent 
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the need for one. The actions of the Jimmy Carter-led negotiating team in the days before 
the U.S. invasion of Haiti are an excellent example of this. 
B. P•ue 0: Limited Interveatioa 
If a state has already failed, preventive action (needless to say) cannot work. 
Therefore, as it becomes in the interest of the international community to remedy the 
problem, more concrete actions are required. This is done through two methods: the 
involvement of UN agencies, other international organisations, and NGOs; and the use of 
limited military force in traditional peacekeeping roles. These actions, however, assume 
that the belligerents within a state are willing to give at least their partial consent to these 
operations. Furthermore, negotiations to reach a peace agreement must continue. 
l.Civil Interventions 
The first method revolves around the need to ensure that the population's basic 
needs are taken care of, since the state can no longer fulfill this function. For example, in 
Haiti, NGOs were able to ensure that even without a functioning government, the 
population did not suffer from widespread disease and famine by assuming the role of the 
state, particularly in the delivery of health care. While still an urgent situation, this gave 
the international community more time to attempt to negotiate a peaceful transition of 
power. 
2.Military Interventions 
Should these groups be unable by themselves to provide the assistance due to the 
intransigence of local forces or the belligerents, then military assistance may be required. 
This can come in two forms: limited assistance and peacekeeping missions. 
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a. Limited assistance 
Limited assistance ensures the delivery of aid stuffs, with the military only in a 
supportive role, such as the earlier U.S. military operation in Somali~ Provide Comfort, 
which airdropped relief supplies. Such action may occur before or during a traditional 
peacekeeping mission. 
b. Peacekeeping mission 
Should limited assistance not be enough, the UN -with the consent of all parties-
may deploy a mission to deal solely with the humanitarian emergency, operating under 
Chapter VI of the UN Charter, while continuing to negotiate a peaceful end to the 
violence. However, caution should be exercised in deploying a traditional force into a 
failed state. B~ause of the volatility of the environment, a force must have both an 
adequate mandate and force structure to deal with potential problems. Furthermore, if the 
consent of the belligerents is withdrawn, the force can not be effective, and therefore it 
too should be withdrawn, or have its mandate changed. Leaving a traditional force in such 
a situation will only work to delegitimize it. 
C. Phase W: Humanitarian Intervention 
If limited assistance and negotiations do not succeed, and the situation in the 
failed state has degenerated into a complex emergency, then a humanitarian intervention 
should be used. The intervention, acting as a peace enforcement mission under Chapter 
Vll of the UN Charter, will necessitate the use ~fa large number of troops, potentially for 
a long period of time, will be very costly, and will carry with it the risk of failure. 
A humanitarian intervention requires a clear, operationally specific mandate that 
identifies the sectors of society that need aid and establishes clear objectives for all forces 
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involved. Furthermore, it requires an adequate force structure, deployed in a timely 
fashion, appropriate to the scope of the mandate, and adequate support from the UN, its 
agencies, and NGOs to ensure that peacebuilding efforts can be undertaken once a secure 
environment is established. Finally, it requires a co-ordinating body with clearly defined 
and agreed-to authority over all actors -civilian and military- to be established as quickly 
as possible.14 
If a proxy force is initially used, whether from NATO, the U.S., or other 
organizations, then the UN must still maintain a presence, and prepare to take over the 
mission once the initial secure environment is created. In Haiti, the handover went 
smoothly because of such prior preparation. In Somalia, there was no preparation, which 
was a contributing factor to UNOSOM D's failure. 
Peace negotiations should continue with all groups, and at no time should the 
mission abandon impartiality. By abandoning impartiality or not negotiating openly with 
aU groups, the mission will quickly be put in to the position of being a belligerent, which 
will complicate the situation enonnously and potentially cost the lives both of civilians 
and of peacekeepers. 
Finally, even during a peace enforcement mission, peacekeepers should perfonn 
the reconstruction tasks that characterise traditional missions. This helps both to rebuild 
the country and to increase the legitimacy of the mission, ensuring greater support and an 
easier time. 
D. Phase IV: Long-Term Development Steps 
After an intervention has begun, there are then four clear stages through which 
any mission must pass to ensure the long·tenn, peaceful stability of the state. The first 
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step is to establish the immediate physical security of the population, whether through aid 
to the state's institutional apparatus, through the use of a traditional peacekeeping 
mission, or through the use of a peace enforcement mission. Only after this is established 
can the mission move on to the next stage. The second step deals with the long-term 
security of the population, and requires the disarmament, demobilisation, and 
reintegration of the combatants into society. This ensures both the safety of the civilian 
population, but also allows for the drawing down of peacekeepers. 
The third step, which can take place simultaneously or after the second step, is 
rebuilding the core institutions of the state. This includes introducing structures of poltical 
accountability, rebuilding the national police forces and judiciary, and insuring that basic 
institutions such as the health system are reconstituted. These institutions should be 
completely overhauled, with the participation of both government and legitimate leaders 
of civil society (i.e. religious leaders, tribal elders, and the intelligentsia). Furthermore, 
holding elections, while creating legitimacy for the mission and the state and therefore an 
important step, should only be done in conjunction with institutional reconstruction. 
Otherwise, as in Haiti, the country may very well fail to change any of its core features. 
The fourth step focuses on the long-term reconstruction or creation of civil 
society, the creation of dispute resolution mechanisms, and the creation of a politically 
stable country. The end goal is to create a country that has both a state and a nation, 
where the citizens enjoy a collective identity fortified by the country's institutions. This 
tier is the work. of years, if not decades, and t)terefore the mission needs to work in co-
operation both with the government and the civil society of the country, in order to avoid 
being seen as a neo-colonial or occupation force. 
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m. lmplieatiou aad Coaelasiou 
A humanitarian intervention that seeks to deal with the roots of a complex 
emergency, rather than merely alter the state cosmetically, must be willing to make a 
long-term commitment. Failing to make this commitment will simply result in the 
widespread failure of any mission seeking to prevent the return of violence. 1berefore, 
the international community must clearly decide what outcome it wishes from the outset. 
Similarly, choosing the correct personnel for such a mission is also vital. The 
mission must be sensitive to local realities, and work with all local actors to ensure 
support for the operation and ensure its long-term success. Furthermore, the leaders of 
these missions should not be appointed for political reasons, but rather for their ability. 
Ideally, the international community should create a body of people both experienced 
with failed states in general and in local conditions in particular in order that they can be 
deployed into these situations. 
This framework also deals with three important problems. Failed states do not 
exist in isolation, nor do they emerge suddenly with no prior warning. Thus, including a 
preventive action element highlights the importance of early warning systems and early 
interventions. This thesis has highlighted that in both case studies, an early effort would 
have both been more successful and substantially less expensive than what later occurred. 
Similarly, the methods of intervention need to be dynamic. Once the warning bells 
start ringing, the UN and other international actors must quickly assess the situation, and 
decide what fonn of intervention is required. A time span of months or years before a 
mission can be deployed jeopardises any hope of success. Furthermore, they must also 
attempt to gain consent and support of the local population, and if they have it, to work to 
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retain it. Finally, whichever form of intervention is taken, the mission must always be 
aware that the situation in a failed state can det~orate very quickly. 
The framework also highlights the need for the fourth phase, long term 
development. In both the case studies examined, the mandates for the mission initially 
divorced security and reconstruction. However, it is impossible to ensure long-term 
security of the population without disanning, demobilising and reintegrating the 
combatants, and reconstructing the state's institutional apparatus. 
This framework is a synthesis of both the lessons learned from the missions to 
Somalia and Haiti, and a reworking of the new theoretical models proposed by the UN 
and other international organisations. Theoretically, it will solve the major problems that 
the UN has faced. But its elements need first to be tested. This is gradually occurring. The 
UN mission in Sierra Leone, while having problems, has embraced the need to deal first 
with the combatants before moving on to other measures. The mission to Kosovo has 
placed all authority, with the exception of the NATO troops, within the UN SRSG, and 
has clearly delineated which groups should deal with each part of societal reconstruction. 
These are excellent first steps. The 'springtime of humanitarian interventions' has 
ended. However, even failure teaches us important lessons. While the problems in the 
Congo were forgotten for thirty years, the problems of Somalia and Haiti have been 
examined, and we can now learn from them. Whether we will see the UN launch another 
failed state intervention on the scale of Somalia is unclear, but already in Africa there are 
states that are sliding towards failure- Sudan remains a perpetual problem, the Congo only 
recently once again saw peacekeepers deployed to end an internal war. Similarly, the 
good projects in Haiti appear to have already crumbled. It is likely that in the near future, 
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we may weU see another complex emergency. Therefore, once these lessons have been 
learned again, it is vital that they are not forgotten. Failed states will not disappear. Nor, 
therefore, should they be ignored. 
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